Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 1

2007

Buy, Sell or Hold? Analyst Fraud form Economic
and Natural Law Perspective
Ronald J. Colombo

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell or Hold? Analyst Fraud form Economic and Natural Law Perspective, 73 Brook. L. Rev. (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol73/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 2

Buy, Sell, or Hold?
ANALYST FRAUD FROM ECONOMIC AND
NATURAL LAW PERSPECTIVES
Ronald J. Colombo†
INTRODUCTION
What are the fundamental purposes of U.S. securities
regulation? To foster efficient capital markets? To protect the
individual investor? To promote virtue in the securities
industry? The question is an important one, as its answer
ought to frame the legislative, regulatory, and judicial
responses to the numerous issues and challenges confronting
the field of securities law. By ignoring the full set of
fundamental purposes of securities regulation, we run the risk
of fashioning remedies inconsonant with the regulatory regime
and hence more likely to undermine, rather than promote, a
consistent, coherent approach to securities regulation. This
Article posits that not all the fundamental purposes of U.S.
securities regulation have been honored equally. Moreover, this
Article suggests that a way of recapturing respect for the full
range of aims that gave rise to the U.S. securities laws is to
replace (or at the very least augment) the prevailing analytical
approach employed in securities law thinking (namely, that of
law and economics) with a different approach (namely, that of
natural law theory).
If one looks at the inspiration behind the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, one quickly finds that, contrary to popular
belief and the focus of current scholarly wisdom, the promotion
of virtue and the extirpation of vice were central to both the
President’s and Congress’s conceptualization of these acts.
Indeed, it was understood and expected by President Roosevelt
and the 72nd Congress that the promotion of virtue in the
†
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securities industry would best serve to protect the individual
investor and resuscitate the capital markets.1
Today, very few understand the securities laws as did
President Roosevelt and Congress in the 1930s. Perhaps the
single most influential reason for the divergence of today’s
understanding of securities regulation and the understanding
of its progenitors is the successful advance of “law and
economics” thinking, which has come to dominate many fields
of study, most especially those concerning economic regulation.
For, under law and economics thinking, the seemingly
subjective concerns of morality and normative values are
displaced by the seemingly objective concerns of economic
reasoning.2
The successful advance of law and economics should not
be surprising given today’s diverse, pluralistic society in which
it is difficult to achieve consensus on arguments that are moral
or normative in nature. 3 For law and economics purports to put
aside those things over which individuals disagree and instead
to focus on those things upon which individuals can agree: that
efficiency should be preferred to inefficiency and that societal
wealth should be maximized.4
Despite the appeal of law and economics, the movement
has had its detractors. One line of criticism levied against it is
that law and economics elevates a societal means (namely,
efficient laws) over more ambitious (and more important)
societal ends. Put differently, law and economics is viewed as
deficient in failing to recognize that law does not exist for its
own sake, but rather to further greater societal goals, such as
the common good. Although individuals might disagree over
what these goals should be, the whole enterprise of using law
to achieve such goals should not be abandoned.5
The second line of criticism takes an opposite tack. To
these detractors, law and economics’ shortcoming is not that
the movement divorces law from normative ends, but rather
that law and economics substitutes the traditional normative
ends of law with its own norms and values: namely, those of
1

See infra Part III.A.
See Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV.
163, 166-73 (1990).
3
Cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (arguing that Western
Civilization no longer possesses a means of resolving disputes of an ethical or moral
nature).
4
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, 166-73.
5
See infra notes 243–244 and accompanying text.
2
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the free market. That is, the problem is not that law and
economics is “value neutral,” but rather that law and economics
is heavily value laden (with efficiency and wealth maximization
serving as its primary values).6
Whatever deficiencies law and economics may suffer
from, it is not unfair to demand, as its proponents often do,
that discourse over law and public policy be on terms that are
based on reason and logic (such as the terms of economic
reasoning), rather than on feelings and opinion (which are
often the bases, actual or perceived, of moral and normative
arguments).7 Therefore, the challenge to those who would
confront law and economics from a normative or moral
perspective is to provide objective, reason-based justifications
for such a perspective. I suggest that natural law theory
provides a philosophical framework, if not the philosophical
framework, most up to this challenge.
A thorough elucidation of the merits of natural law
reasoning per se is beyond the scope of this Article. (Moreover,
others have effectively done this.) Instead, this Article
examines what the application of natural law thinking to
securities regulation would accomplish. This Article shall
demonstrate that the application of natural law thinking to
securities regulation generates results that hew more closely to
the original intent of the securities laws than do those
generated via a law and economics approach. Thus, on at least
this ground, natural law reasoning can be proclaimed as the
superior analytical approach to securities regulation. Moreover,
as stated previously, application of natural law reasoning to
securities law issues can also serve as a means of restoring
respect for an original, driving objective of the Securities Acts
that has largely been forgotten: to help mold a more virtuous
securities industry.
This Article shall utilize a specific securities law
problem to illustrate the promise and potential of a natural law
approach to securities regulation: research analyst conflicts of
interest. Part I of this Article sets forth the background to this
particular problem, reviewing the role of research analysts and
identifying the conflicts in question. Part II discusses why the
primary antifraud mechanism of the securities laws (Rule
10b-5) is inadequate to address this problem, hence prompting
6
7

See infra note 219.
See Posner, supra note 2, at 166-73.
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calls for (and attempts at) other solutions. After reviewing the
goals and values of U.S. securities law in general, Part III
proceeds to analyze the solutions (proposed and potential) to
the analyst problem, first from a law and economics perspective
and then via a natural law approach. A juxtaposition of these
two approaches reveals that the insights and solutions offered
by natural law reasoning are superior to those offered by an
economic approach to the law because, at a minimum, they are
more harmonious with the complete set of goals and values
that define the U.S. securities regulatory regime.
I.

BACKGROUND

The research analyst conflict-of-interest scandal has led
to increased litigation concerning, and regulation of, these
specialized market participants. Research analysts, who issue
widely followed research reports recommending whether a
particular security should be bought or sold, were found to
have issued reports and recommendations inconsistent with
their own true opinions. Additionally, most analysts failed to
disclose in their research reports the existence of substantial
conflicts of interest that could reasonably be expected to
influence their recommendations. Investors, relying on these
reports and recommendations, claimed injury by virtue of their
purchase of a misrepresented or overpriced security (which
subsequently declined in value). This Part of the Article shall
explain more fully the role of research analysts within the
securities industry, the nature of their conflicts of interest, and
the nature of their misconduct as alleged by investors and
regulators.
A.

The Role of Research Analysts

The U.S. Supreme Court has remarked that research
analysts are “necessary to the preservation of a healthy
market.”8 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
has similarly observed that “[t]he value to the entire market of
[analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in
pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret
out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work

8

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
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redounds to the benefit of all investors.”9 What exactly do
research analysts do that is so important?
Research analysts “perform research and analysis on
companies in order to evaluate securities and estimate their
value as investments.”10 This research and analysis is then
typically presented in a report, along with a recommendation
regarding whether the covered company’s security should be
bought, sold, or held.11 “Sell-side” analysts, who comprise about
a third of all analysts, are typically employed by brokerage
firms or investment banks.12 These analysts produce their
research reports for their firm’s customers and other investors,
ordinarily free of charge and/or contingent upon a certain
minimum level of investing with the analyst’s firm.13 As a
result, the information produced by sell-side analysts becomes
“widely disseminated in the financial markets.”14 The
dissemination of this information is valuable to the investing
9

Id. at 658 n.17 (quoting SEC’s brief, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1406 (1981))
(alterations in original).
10
Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking
the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003).
11
Id. at 1040-41. As Professors Fisch and Sale explain in detail:
In theory, [research analysts] serve as information conduits . . . between the
companies they investigate and actual or potential investors in those
companies. Their work involves collecting and processing information from a
variety of sources, both inside and outside of the company. As a result of their
research, analysts typically produce two products: a “report” and a
“recommendation.” In the report, analysts offer facts and opinions about the
subject company and its securities. The recommendation, which is generally a
selection from a series of rating categories, advises the investing public to
buy, sell, or continue to hold the securities in question . . . . Analysts read and
digest company reports and other secondary sources, speak with company
officers and employees, and, where appropriate, visit company sites to help
them form an independent impression of the business. Analysts review
company documents filed with the SEC . . . and secondary sources like
Standard & Poor’s that compile, summarize, and republish it. Analysts also
may review trade publications, including industry-specific magazines.
Id. (citations omitted); see also John Jacob, Steve Rock & David P. Weber, Do Analysts
at Independent Research Firms Make Better Earnings Forecasts? 7 (July 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702.
12
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1040-41. There are other kinds of
analysts, such as “independent analysts” (who are not associated with investment
banks and who sell their research to the investing public) and “buy-side analysts” (who
provide their research to the investment banks that employ them, and not to investors
or the public at large), but these analysts do not share the same conflicts that sell-side
analysts do. See id. at 1041 & n.18. Thus, independent and buy-side analysts are not
the focus of this Article and, unless otherwise indicated, the terms “analysts,”
“securities analysts,” and “research analysts” shall be used interchangeably in
reference to sell-side analysts alone.
13
See id. at 1040-41.
14
Id. at 1041.
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public not only insofar as individual investors might rely
directly upon the analysis or recommendations contained in a
particular analyst’s reports,15 but, moreover, insofar as the
dissemination of this information contributes to the efficiency
of the market, thereby helping to foster the accurate pricing of
securities.16
B.

The Conflicts of Interest

As indicated, sell-side analysts are typically employed
by brokerage firms or investment banks.17 Since it is the desire
of such firms to attract and retain investment banking clients,
institutional pressures toward this end unsurprisingly come to
bear upon sell-side analysts.18 This is problematic because
investment banking clients (current and potential) can be
expected to favor positive research coverage over accurate
coverage, and thus analysts are pressured to skew their reports

15

See Robert P. Sieland, Note, Caveat Emptor! After All the Regulatory
Hoopla, Securities Analysts Remain Conflicted on Wall Street, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 531,
544 (2003).
16
See Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters: Securities Analyst
Liability and Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV.
415, 424 (2001); see also Robert Brooks & Huabing Wang, The Securities Litigation
Reform and Its Impact on Analyst Research 7-8 (2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=606822 (setting forth results of a study that “highlights
analysts’ role as an information intermediary in the financial market, especially when
information in the market tends to be complex” and how such a role is “increasingly
important” following the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Fisch &
Sale, supra note 10, at 1061 (referring to the work of the sell-side research analyst as a
“public good”). This understanding is grounded upon the efficient market hypothesis,
which, in its widely applied “semi-strong” form, theorizes that “stock price will
incorporate all publicly-available information relevant to the valuation of the stock.”
See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 97 n.59 (2006); see also Robert J. Shiller, From the Efficient
Market Theory to Behavioral Finance 4 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1385,
2002), available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=349660. Thus, the more
information of relevance regarding a security that is made available to the market, the
more accurately that security’s price will reflect its value. See Richard C. Strassner,
How Much Information Is Enough: Securities Market Information and the Quest for a
More Efficient Market, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 5, 9-12 (2003).
17
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18
See Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked, Shocked: The “Discovery” of
Analyst Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 89, 97 (2004); see also Fisch & Sale,
supra note 10, at 1045-54. Investment banking clients typically include companies
seeking to raise capital via the sale of securities to investors. This business—
underwriting—is highly lucrative because the investment bank selected to lead the
underwriting sales effort typically earns a fee of approximately 7% of the total amount
of equity securities sold in the underwriting. See George J. Papaioannou & Adrian
Gauci, Deregulation and Competition in Underwriting: Review of the Evidence and New
Findings, 5 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 47, 59 (2006).
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in a positive direction.19 A textbook conflict-of-interest case
arises: on the one hand, the analyst is expected to produce a
fair, objective research report for the benefit of investors, but
on the other hand the analyst has an interest in producing a
report that portrays the covered company in a positive light in
order to generate (or maintain) lucrative investment-banking
revenue for the benefit of his or her firm.20
And the conflict in question is not just theoretical—its
existence, and its effects, have been empirically demonstrated.21
“According
to
the
SEC,
downgrades
[in
analyst
recommendations]22 occurred in only 1% of the securities
covered for the year 2000.”23 Some firms adopted official policies
forbidding analysts from “making negative or controversial
comments” about investment banking clients.24 Further still,
many firms linked an analyst’s salary, and/or the analyst’s
bonus, to his or her contribution to the firm’s investment
banking business.25 As Laura Unger, then acting Chairwoman
of the SEC, testified before Congress on July 31, 2001:
First, an analyst’s salary and bonus may be linked to the
profitability of the firm’s investment banking business, motivating
analysts to attract and retain investment banking clients for the
firm. Second, at some firms, analysts are accountable to investment
banking for their ratings. Third, analysts sometimes own a piece of
the company they analyze, mostly through pre-IPO share
acquisitions.26

Thus, structural conflicts of interest exist for many analysts,
and several have clearly allowed their research to be affected
by these conflicts.27 An investigation of Merrill Lynch, for
example, revealed an analyst who publicly recommended
certain securities for purchase, but privately described these
19
20
21

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047.
See id.
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 18, at 95-99; Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at

1047-54.
22
That is, where an analyst changed a recommendation from more favorable
to less favorable.
23
Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047.
24
Id. at 1049.
25
See id. at 1052-54; see also RICHARD ROBERTS, WALL STREET 60 (2002).
26
Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their Research
Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong.
(2001) (testimony of Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101ortslu.htm.
27
See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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same securities as “junk”;28 an analyst at Salomon Smith
Barney who rated an issuer as a “buy” was discovered to have
indicated to two colleagues that the company was a “pig” and
should instead be rated “underperform.”29
C.

Claims Against Research Analysts

While the market was performing favorably in the
1990s, relatively scant serious attention was paid to the issue
of analyst conflicts of interest.30 Even less litigation was
generated over the issue.31 But as the market began to falter in
1999, and as stock prices began to drop, analysts became the
focus of scrutiny and litigation.32
The New York Attorney General, the SEC, the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), the New York
Stock Exchange, and the North American Securities
Administrators Association all launched investigations into the
conduct of research analysts, which resulted in a “Global
Settlement” among the regulators and ten Wall Street firms.33
Under the terms of the settlement, “the settling firms agreed to
pay a total of approximately . . . $875 million in penalties and
disgorgement . . . , $433 million to fund independent research,
and $80 million to fund and promote investor education.”34
28

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1049.
See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 757 (2005).
30
See Moses, supra note 18, at 97-98.
31
See id.
32
See Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts’ Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest:
Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud? 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 631, 631-33 (2002); see
also Moses, supra note 18, at 97-104.
33
See Moses, supra note 18, at 99-103; see also SEC Launches Inquiry into
Research Analyst Practices, 7 No. 22 Andrews’ Bank & Lender Liab. Litig. Rep. 11
(May 16, 2002).
34
Moses, supra note 18, at 102-03. Additionally,
29

the Global Settlement requires the brokerage firms to insulate their research
analysts from investment banking pressure by: (i) physically separating the
departments; (ii) requiring senior management to determine the research
budget without input from investment banking; (iii) prohibiting any
investment banking role in evaluating analysts or determining their
compensation; (iv) requiring the managers of the research group alone to
make all decisions to initiate or terminate company-specific coverage; and (v)
keeping analysts out of ‘beauty contests’ and roadshows. In addition, the
firms agreed to purchase independent research from at least three outside
firms, to furnish that research to its customers for the next five years, and to
make its own analysts’ historical ratings and price forecasts publicly
available in order to enable investors to compare analyst performance
throughout the industry.
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Additionally, by November 2002, “over 150 securities
fraud class actions were pending against Merrill Lynch alone,
based primarily on analyst conflict-of-interest allegations.”35
These actions were typically brought under section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, which “prohibits fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security.”36 The crux of these
complaints is that an analyst’s failure to disclose conflicts of
interest constitutes a material omission and/or that an
analyst’s publishing of a disingenuous opinion constitutes a
material misstatement.37 This, in turn, renders the analyst’s
research report(s) false or misleading, and thereby constitutes
a fraud in connection with plaintiff’s purchase of the security
(or securities) that are the subject of the research report.38
What makes these cases particularly interesting is that, in
many ways, they test the limits of existing securities law.39
II.

ANALYST LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS

A.

Rule 10b-5

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors” in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.40 SEC Rule 10b-5,
promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, has been the principal mechanism by which investors have
challenged the alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions in
research reports.41 Although multiple theories of liability can be
formulated pursuant to Rule 10b-5 (such as liability on the part
of those who “employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,” or who “engage in any act, practice, or course of
Id. at 103.
35

Id. at 104. As of November 2007, a large number of these have been
settled. See Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll, Securities Fraud/Investor Protection,
Merrill Lynch Co. and Henry Blodget, http://www.cmht.com/cases_merrilllynch.php.
36
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see also Moses, supra note 18, at 104.
37
See Moses, supra note 18, at 104-05.
38
See id. at 105.
39
See id. at 114-15; see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1057-58.
40
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2000).
41
See supra text accompanying note 36.
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business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person”42), the primary means by which alleged
analyst misconduct has been challenged has been via the
assertion of liability based upon “misstatements or omissions”
within the context of a private right of action, and thus this
shall be the focus of this Article.43 Additionally, this Article
shall assume that all of the factual information contained in an
analyst’s report concerning the covered issuer and security is
accurate and complete. This is because, as commentators have
pointed out, the issue of liability for false factual information
contained in a research report (such as misstating the revenue
of a covered company) is not a particularly difficult one to
resolve.44 Furthermore, this assumption allows one to focus on
the more difficult questions of analyst liability arising from
(1) misstatements concerning the analyst’s opinions and
recommendations as set forth in his or her report, and/or (2)
omissions concerning the analyst’s conflicts of interest.
To state a valid claim for violation of Rule 10b-5 based
upon a misstatement or omission, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant “(1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of
material fact, (3) with scienter, (4) in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, (5) upon which the plaintiff
relied, and (6) that reliance proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injury.”45 These elements of Rule 10b-5 liability shall be
examined in turn.46 With regard to omission-based liability,
this section shall also briefly examine whether an analyst must
42
43

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
See Moses, supra note 18, at 105. The theory of these lawsuits is as follows:

When analysts, with the intent to gain business through manipulation of
security prices, yield to the pressures of investment banking conflicts, they
have perpetrated fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities. . . . Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its
corresponding Rule 10b-5 make these behaviors unlawful.
Sullivan, supra note 16, at 427.
44
See, e.g., Shirli Fabbri Weiss, Securities Analysts in Securities Class
Actions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 431, 454 (P.L.I. Corp. Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 1136, 1999).
45
Kevin P. Roddy, Eight Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW, at 141, 177 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SK027, 2004). It should also be
noted that in an enforcement action undertaken by the SEC, the elements of reliance
and loss causation need not be demonstrated. See SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711
(6th Cir. 1985).
46
The jurisdictional requirement that defendant made “use of any means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange” shall be assumed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
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owe a duty to a plaintiff in order for that plaintiff to maintain a
Rule 10b-5 cause of action.47 As shall be seen, there are
significant ambiguities concerning the application of Rule
10b-5 to analyst misconduct.
1. Misstatement or Omission
The first element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is that the
defendant in question made a misstatement or omission.48
Despite the oft-repeated characterization of Rule 10b-5 liability
as simply pertaining to “misstatements or omissions,”49 the
actual text of Rule 10b-5 does not impose liability upon
“misstatements” or “omissions” generally, but rather upon “any
untrue statement of material fact” or the omission of “a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made . . . not misleading”:50
It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . . . .51

The omission in a research report of a statement revealing an
analyst’s conflicts of interest would certainly constitute the
omission of a “fact.” With regard to misstated opinions,
however, this text provides some difficulty in that it requires us
to consider whether an analyst’s opinion or recommendation
could ever constitute an “untrue statement of . . . fact.”52
As opinions are, by definition, not statements of fact, it
could seem to follow, a fortiori, that an analyst’s opinions
(including his or her recommendations) could not, by definition,
constitute an untrue statement of fact.53 However, at issue is
47

See infra Part II.A.7.
See Roddy, supra note 45, at 177.
49
See id.
50
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
51
Id.
52
Id. (emphasis added).
53
See, e.g., In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 64 (D. Mass.
1998) (“[A] ‘recommended’ or ‘buy’ rating is not actionable because opinions generally
do not provide sufficient basis for 10b-5 liability. . . . A recommendation or rating by an
independent securities firm is the purest of opinions.”) (citation omitted); see also
Wright v. IBM, 796 F. Supp. 1120, 1124-25 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating that “actions for
violations of the federal securities laws typically may not be predicated on mere
opinions or projections,” although acknowledging that “the recent trend . . . has moved
toward recognition of an expanding range of opinions and projections as potentially
actionable”); see also Moses, supra note 18, at 112.
48
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not the correctness of the analyst’s opinion or recommendation
per se, but rather whether what is set forth as the analyst’s
opinion or recommendation is truly the analyst’s opinion or
recommendation. That is, although an opinion is not the same
thing as a statement of fact, whether or not an individual
possesses a particular opinion is itself a factual question.54
Thus, to the extent that an analyst declares that “my opinion
is x” or “my recommendation is y,” he or she is fairly
characterized as making a factual assertion as to what his or
her opinion or recommendation is.55 While some courts have
held that “analysts’ optimistic statements can be actionable if
not genuinely and reasonably believed,”56 others “have found
that recommendations and statements in analysts reports are
inactionable statements of opinion.”57
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the actionability
of disingenuous opinions, albeit within the context of proxy
solicitation, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.58 In
Virginia Bankshares, plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s proxy
solicitation materials were materially misleading in violation of
§ 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.59 The bases of
plaintiffs’ allegation in Virginia Bankshares were statements
contained in the proxy solicitation materials regarding
defendant’s directors’ stated beliefs that (1) minority
shareholders would receive a “fair” price and “high” value for
their shares under the terms of a merger proposal under
consideration, and that (2) the directors recommended adoption
of the merger proposal for these reasons.60 Plaintiffs alleged
that these statements did not reflect the directors’ true beliefs,
54
See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch.D. 459, 483 (Ch. App. 1885) (“[T]he
state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.”).
55
See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a “projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual
assertions,” including the assertion that “the statement is genuinely believed”); see also
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892) (acknowledging that
one’s state of mind can be “a material fact to be proved”) (non-securities law context);
Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918) (Hand, J.) (“An
opinion is a fact. . . . When the parties are so situated that the buyer may reasonably
rely upon the expression of the seller’s opinion, it is no excuse to give a false one.”)
(non-securities law context).
56
Weiss, supra note 44, at 441; see also Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1083
(recommending “a rule that treats analyst recommendations as factual statements and
holds analysts accountable if they do not actually believe those statements”).
57
Weiss, supra note 44, at 454; see also supra note 53.
58
501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
59
Id. at 1086-87.
60
Id. at 1088.
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hence rendering the proxy literature materially misleading.61
The Court concluded that although both such statements were
indeed “factual”62 (as well as material63), they would only be
actionable under § 14(a) if they could be deemed to “expressly
or impliedly assert[] something false or misleading about” their
underlying subject matter.64 That is, “disbelief or undisclosed
motivation, standing alone” was deemed “insufficient to satisfy
the element of fact that must be established under § 14(a),”65
but a falsely presented opinion coupled with “something false
or misleading in what the statement expressly or impliedly
declared about its subject” would be actionable under § 14(a).66
The Court resisted the recognition of liability “on mere disbelief
or undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the
proxy statement was false or misleading about its subject,”
noting that it would not permit litigation “confined solely to . . .
the ‘impurities’ of a director’s ‘unclean heart.’”67
Virginia Bankshares, then, recognizes the correct
characterization of feigned opinions and/or recommendations:
such statements are properly deemed untrue statements of
fact. However, Virginia Bankshares adds to the complexity of
the issue by proceeding to hold that, even though factual, such
statements are nevertheless not necessarily actionable per se
(at least within the context of § 14(a) actions). Whether the
reasoning of Virginia Bankshares will be applied to research
analysts statements challenged under Rule 10b-5 (and, if so,
how) remains to be seen. If it were applied, actions against
analysts who issued otherwise-accurate reports containing
misstated opinions might be characterized as grounded upon
“mere disbelief,” and thus not capable of entitling plaintiffs to
relief. On the other hand, a better argument could be made in
favor of the proposition that an analyst’s opinion “impliedly
asserts something false or misleading” about the underlying
security itself, and is not, therefore, properly characterized as
61

Id. at 1088-89
Id. at 1092.
63
Id. at 1090-91.
64
Id. at 1096.
65
Id. at 1090-91.
66
Id.
67
Id. The Court acknowledged that “it would be rare to find a case with
evidence solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without further proof that the
statement was defective as to its subject matter.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court felt it
important to circumscribe liability in such cases given that “the temptation to rest an
otherwise nonexistent § 14(a) action on psychological enquiry alone would threaten . . .
strike suits and attrition by discovery.” Id.
62
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merely a statement of personal belief divorced from the subject
matter at issue (that is, the covered securities). This is because
a “buy” rating, for example, impliedly—if not expressly—
asserts that the security in question is going to perform well,
regardless of the analyst’s own personal beliefs. Under such a
line of reasoning, the analyst’s false opinions would be
actionable as per the logic of Virginia Bankshares.
2. Materiality
“A fact is material if it is substantially likely that the
fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly
altering the ‘total mix’ of information available, and if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important to the investment decision.”68 As the
continuum of potential misstatements and omissions is a long
one, the question of materiality is ordinarily considered a
question of fact.69
In some instances, however, the question of materiality
would seem resolvable as a matter of law. For example, it is not
difficult to imagine a misstatement or omission that would be
immaterial as a matter of law by virtue of its marginality, such
as an opinion that is only slightly exaggerated or a conflict that
is quite attenuated. A more interesting question is whether
even egregious misstatements of a research analyst’s opinion,
or the omission of very clear and serious conflicts of interest on
the part of the analyst, might be properly considered
immaterial as a matter of law. Put differently, perhaps, as a
matter of law, analyst opinions and analyst conflicts should be
deemed per se immaterial.70 For it is not altogether obvious that
a reasonable investor could ever view an analyst’s opinion as
“significantly altering” the “total mix” of information available
regarding a given security or company. In the case of an
analyst’s opinion in line with those of all (or most) other
analysts, how would such a redundant opinion “significantly
68
Roddy, supra note 45, at 178; see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988) (adopting as materiality standard for Rule 10b-5 the standard previously
set forth by the Court within the proxy solicitation context in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
69
See Roddy, supra note 45, at 178.
70
As one court observed: “a statement of opinion emanating from a research
analyst is far more subjective and far less certain [than a statement of fact from an
issuer], and often appears in tandem with conflicting opinions from other analysts as
well as new statements from the issuer.” DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243,
246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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alter” the “total mix” of information available? With regard to
an outlier opinion by an analyst, how could an outlier—by
definition, almost—ever be viewed as significantly altering the
total mix of information available? And, if the opinions of
covering analysts are split as to a particular security or
company, again, how could the opinion of one additional
analyst significantly alter the total mix of information?
Regarding an analyst’s failure to disclose his or her
conflicts of interest, the general presumption has been that
such an omission would be material71 and, consequently,
actionable under Rule 10b-5.72 The prevailing assumption
notwithstanding, the conflation of “materiality” with
“actionability” is suspect. A strict textual analysis of Rule 10b-5
reveals that not every omission of a material fact is unlawful,
but rather only the omission of “a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” is
unlawful.73 The type of omission contemplated by Rule 10b-5,
then, would be one in which a communication states that the
company should perform well next year on account of an
expected doubling of revenue, without mentioning that a
tripling of expenses is also expected.74 Omission of information
concerning an analyst’s conflicts of interest, however, does not
so clearly make the other statements in a research report
misleading. Courts and commentators have not generally
focused on this issue, but, as indicated, have rather presumed
that so long as the omitted information is material, its

71
See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 428 (2001) (“Based on the assumption that
conflicts of interest influence the objectivity of research reports and recommendations
made by analysts, conflicts of interest appear to be factors that the reasonable investor
would consider when making an investment decision.”).
72
See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970)
(“[F]ailure to inform the customer fully of its possible conflict of interest, in that it was
a market maker in the securities which it strongly recommended for purchase . . . was
an omission of a material fact in violation of Rule 10b-5.”).
73
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
74
See, e.g., Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp., No. 95-CV-6303, 1997
WL 602808, at *11 n.30 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997).
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nondisclosure is unlawful under Rule 10b-5.75 This presumption
may be unwarranted.76
Additionally, assuming that all the underlying facts
concerning the covered company and security are complete and
accurate, are not reasonable investors armed with all the
information they need to make an investment decision,
regardless of the analyst’s own opinions, recommendations, and
biases? And is this not especially the case if, as in many cases,
investors rely upon their brokers’ advice (who apply expertise
in sifting through research reports and other market
information) in deciding upon which securities to buy, sell, or
hold? And what if, added to this information, the report also
fully discloses whatever conflicts of interest the analyst has?
Would this tip the materiality balance regarding misstated
opinions in favor of immateriality? A strong argument could be
made that it would.77 And arguments such as these (albeit
outside of the specific context of research analyst reports) have
led to the development of the judicially crafted “bespeaks
caution” doctrine,78 which Congress codified, in limited form, as
a safe harbor under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 79 each of which is addressed below.
a. Safe Harbor of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which includes a “safe
harbor” provision eliminating liability for certain forwardlooking statements.80 The applicability of the safe harbor
provision on analyst reports is uncertain.81
75
But see In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“A determination that information missing from a registration statement is material
does not end our analysis. We must also decide whether the issuer had the duty to
disclose that material fact such that its omission made the statement misleading.”).
76
Of course, failure to disclose a conflict of interest would be actionable
under Rule 10b-5 if the research report affirmatively touts its objectivity. See Shah v.
Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2006).
77
But see DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting that empirical evidence suggests that “some research analysts may have the
ability to influence market prices on the basis of their recommendations”).
78
Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 71 (1999).
79
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
80
Id. at § 102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5).
81
See Weiss, supra note 44, at 442-44.
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By its terms, the safe harbor excludes as a basis of
liability “any forward-looking statement” that is either
immaterial or, more importantly, is “accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from
those in the forward-looking statement.”82 Thus, it appears as
though the PSLRA’s safe harbor could provide a “Joe Isuzu”83
defense for research analysts who issue reports containing
biased, exaggerated, or otherwise dishonest opinions and
recommendations, but who also include in their reports
accurate and complete information regarding the covered
company and its securities, as well as an accurate and complete
disclosure concerning whatever conflict(s) of interest the
analyst has (for this information and disclosure, properly
presented, would arguably constitute “meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause
actual results to differ materially from those” expressed in the
analyst’s opinions and recommendations).84 Indeed, “Congress
specifically intended that application of the safe harbor should
be determined without any inquiry into the defendant’s state of
mind.”85 However, the utility of the safe harbor to lying
analysts would be limited if one takes the position that the only
82
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000). The safe harbor provision also excludes from
liability forward-looking statements regarding which scienter cannot be proven, but
because of the disjunctive nature in which the safe harbor was drafted, the question of
scienter need not be reached if the conditions regarding “meaningful cautionary
statements” are satisfied. Id.
83
“Joe Isuzu” was a fictional salesperson, portrayed by actor David Leisure,
in a television ad campaign launched by American Isuzu Motors, Inc. in the mid1980s. See Cullen Thompson, Isuzu Case Study (Nov. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.unc.edu/~cullent/isuzu.html. In the commercials, Joe Isuzu “would say
anything to get consumers to buy his car” and “outright lied to his audience.” Id.
However, as he was doing this, “the words ‘He’s lying’ ran across the bottom of the
screen followed by the actual facts.” Id.
84
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1). I am assuming here that an analyst’s opinion
regarding the future prospects of a particular security is indeed a “forward-looking
statement” as that term is understood under the safe harbor.
85
John F. Olson et al., Recent Developments in Disclosure and Dealing with
Analysts and the Financial Press, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW, at 313, 346-47 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course No. SE10, 1999). See also Brooks & Wang,
supra note 16, at 4 (noting that Senator Joseph Biden remarked that the PSLRA’s safe
harbor grants corporations “a license to lie”). But see ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELLE H.
HUDSON, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS §
7.5 (2005) (“Many commentators believe that the courts will not protect the
dissemination of knowingly false statements accompanied by literally compliant
cautionary statements.”); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (“The safe harbor provision does not apply where
the defendants knew at the time that they were issuing statements that the
statements contained false and misleading information . . . .”).
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disclosure capable of constituting a “meaningful cautionary
statement[]” with regard to an analyst’s misstated opinion
would be one indicating that the research analyst was, in fact,
misstating his or her opinion.86
Another question concerning the availability of the
PSLRA safe harbor is whether its limited applicability even
extends to research analysts. For the safe harbor only applies
to forward-looking statements made by (1) an issuer; (2) a
person or entity acting on the issuer’s behalf; and (3) “an
underwriter, with respect to information provided by such
issuer or information derived from information provided by
such issuer.”87 The only category into which a research analyst
might reasonably fall is the third.
Although an analyst’s report is based largely on
information “provided by [an] issuer” and/or “derived from
information provided by [an] issuer,” whether the analyst
constitutes an “underwriter” is far from clear.88 The term
“underwriter” in the PSLRA has “the same meanings as in the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80b–1 et seq.],”89
which is:
“Underwriter” means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest
is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in
excess of the usual and customary distributor’s or seller’s
commission.90

In those cases where the analyst’s own firm is engaged
in the underwriting of the security covered by the analyst’s
reports, such analysts could be deemed (depending on the facts)
to have participated in the underwriting. Indeed, a key
contention in many of the Rule 10b-5 actions against analysts
is that analysts have had indirect (if not direct) participation in
their firm’s banking activity via their role in touting the
86
See supra note 83; see also infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing “meaningful
cautionary statements” within the context of the bespeaks caution doctrine).
87
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (2000).
88
See HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 85, at 552 n.164 (opining that the safe
harbor “would only apply, if at all, to an investment bank that underwrote securities of
the issuer. It would not apply directly to analysts.”).
89
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(20).
90
Id. § 80b-2(a)(20).
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underwritten securities in their research reports.91 Moreover,
regardless of his or her actual role in the underwriting effort,
the mere fact that the analyst is an employee of the
underwriting firm could arguably transform him or her into an
“underwriter” for purposes of the PSLRA under agency
principles.92
In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference which recommended passage of the PSLRA, the
“muzzling effect of abusive securities litigation” was discussed
prominently.93 The Committee explained that it “adopted a
statutory ‘safe harbor’ to enhance market efficiency by
encouraging
companies
to
disclose
forward-looking
information.”94 The Committee’s comments on the provision’s
applicability to underwriters does not, however, shed much
light on whether an analyst would be covered.95 Thus, even if
Rule 10b-5 liability were found applicable to a research analyst
accused of including misleading opinions in his or her report,
whether such analyst could avail himself or herself of the
PSLRA’s safe harbor by revealing his or her conflicts of interest
is itself an open question.
b. “Bespeaks Caution” Doctrine
In promulgating the PSLRA’s statutory safe harbor, the
Conference Committee explicitly noted that it did not intend
for the safe harbor “to replace the judicial ‘bespeaks caution’
doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by
the courts.”96 The bespeaks caution doctrine has been applied to
analyst statements in securities litigation brought against

91

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047; cf. Olson et al., supra note 85, at

371.
92

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. C (2006).
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, in SAILING IN
“SAFE HARBORS”: DRAFTING FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES, at 39, 52-53 (P.L.I.
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1020, 1997) [hereinafter
Joint Statement].
94
Id. at 53.
95
See id. at 55 (“The safe harbor covers underwriters, but only insofar as the
underwriters provide forward looking information that is based on or ‘derived from’
information provided by the issuer. Because underwriters have what is effectively an
adversarial relationship with issuers in performing due diligence, the use of the term
‘derived from’ affords underwriters some latitude so that they may disclose adverse
information that this issuer did not necessarily ‘provide.’”).
96
Id. at 56.
93
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research analysts97 and may approximate the “Joe Isuzu”
defense contemplated earlier, regardless of the availability of
the statutory safe harbor.98
The judicially created bespeaks caution doctrine
essentially
reduces
otherwise-material
statements
to
99
immaterial under certain circumstances. Under the doctrine,
“forecasts, opinions, or projections do not amount to ‘material
misrepresentations’ if ‘meaningful cautionary statements’
accompany the forward-looking statements.”100 As with the
PSLRA’s safe harbor, the definition of “meaningful” is not
entirely clear, but will depend on the circumstances. Again,
Virginia Bankshares might be instructive here, as in that case
the Supreme Court addressed the closely related issue of
materiality within the context of a proxy statement containing
both accurate data and misleading statements:
[P]etitioners are on perfectly firm ground insofar as they argue that
publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can render a
misleading proposition too unimportant to ground liability.
But not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If
it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one
and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and
liability should follow.101

In the case of those analysts who have fully disclosed
their conflict(s) of interest, it becomes difficult to see how such
analysts’ opinions could ever have a substantial likelihood of
being considered important to the investment decision of a
reasonable investor. For would not a reasonable investor,
informed of an analyst’s conflicts, appropriately discount the
importance of that analyst’s opinion as subject to potential
bias? Thus, full disclosure of an analyst’s conflict(s) of interest
could be deemed to put investors on notice that, at a minimum,
the opinions and recommendations contained in the analyst’s
report are subject to bias and are not to be relied upon as an
“important” factor in a reasonable investor’s research decisions,

97

See In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y.

98

See supra text accompanying note 83.
See Roddy, supra note 45, at 218.
Id.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991).

2004).
99
100
101
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thereby defeating any argument that such opinions are
material.102
Taken to its logical conclusion, then, the bespeaks
caution doctrine would appear to insulate analysts from
liability for false opinions, so long as the reader of the analyst’s
reports has sufficient disclosure of the analyst’s conflicts along
with complete and accurate information regarding the company
as outlined above—in other words, disclosure that would
enable the investor to (1) grasp the incongruity between the
analyst’s recommendations or opinions and the condition
and/or prospects of the covered company, and (2) discount the
analyst’s opinions on account of clear grounds for bias.103 As
Professor Palmiter has explained:
Federal courts in securities fraud cases have declared that
disclosures must be read in their context and if forecasts, opinions,
or projections are accompanied by sufficiently clear warnings so that
no reasonable investor would rely on them, they are not
actionable.104

Since the bespeaks caution doctrine, unlike the PSLRA’s
safe harbor, is not limited to issuers and underwriters,105
research analysts should not have much difficulty invoking its
potential applicability to their statements. However, some have
argued that “all the cautionary language in the world does not
remove the taint of fraud from statements of opinion that are
actually false.”106 To that end, there does not appear to be any
decision in which a court applied the bespeaks caution doctrine
to protect a defendant who was accused of making a knowingly
false statement. Thus, as with the safe harbor provision of the
PSLRA, the bespeaks caution defense is ultimately of
questionable utility to a research analyst who includes
102
This understanding of the expected effect that knowledge of analyst
conflicts can be expected to have on investors presents, in turn, a strong argument in
favor of finding the omission in a research report of such conflicts to be itself material.
And it certainly is fair to say that regulators apparently find such omissions important
(and, as can be safely assumed, material as well), as evidenced by their aggressive
prosecution of those research analysts whose firms entered into the aforementioned
Global Settlement. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
103
Cf. Weiss, supra note 44, at 454-55 (observing that sufficient warnings and
disclaimers “may insulate the analyst from liability”); Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at
1097 (“publishing accurate facts in a proxy statement can render a misleading
proposition too unimportant to ground liability.”).
104
Palmiter, supra note 78, at 71 (addressing the bespeaks caution doctrine).
105
See supra note 87 and accompanying text; id. at 71-73.
106
In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
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dishonest statements of opinion in a report, even if the report
is otherwise complete and accurate, and contains sufficient
disclosure of the analyst’s conflicts.
3. Scienter
Scienter for Rule 10b-5 purposes encompasses an
“intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” or recklessness to
that same end.107 Intentionally misportrayed opinions on the
part of analysts satisfy the element of scienter by definition.
Scienter would most likely be difficult to prove within the
context of an omission concerning conflicts of interest,
especially in the absence of any accompanying false or
misleading statements.108 For, in the absence of a skewed
research report that contained false or misleading statements,
the omission of a statement regarding the analyst’s conflicts of
interest would appear to be unintentional rather than
purposeful. However, it could be argued, perhaps, that even a
completely honest analyst has an incentive to keep secret any
conflicts of interest in order to bolster the credibility of his or
her reports, and the factual record could potentially bear that
argument out. In any event, difficulty in demonstrating the
existence of scienter goes to questions of proof, and not
whether, theoretically, this particular element could ever be
satisfied. Thus, the element of scienter does not pose a
theoretical challenge to the applicability of Rule 10b-5 liability
to analysts whose reports include misstatements and/or
omissions.
4. In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities
The courts have interpreted the element of “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” quite
broadly, encompassing practically everything that played a role
in a reasonable investor’s decision to purchase or sell a
security.109 Thus:

107
See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1305, 1317 (2004) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
108
See Gross, supra note 32, at 664.
109
See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc); see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971).
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In cases involving the public dissemination of false and misleading
information, courts have held that “where the fraud alleged involves
the public dissemination of information in a medium upon which an
investor would presumably rely, the ‘in connection with’ element
may be established by proof of the materiality of the
misrepresentation and the means of its dissemination.”110

In light of the standard applied, this element of Rule
10b-5 liability would readily be satisfied in the case of a
securities analyst whose reports included material omissions or
misstatements, and, as with scienter, does not present a
theoretical ambiguity with regard to the Rule’s applicability.111
5. Reliance
A Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must prove that “defendant’s
misrepresentation or omission caused him to purchase the
recommended security.”112 This element is known as reliance,
sometimes referred to as “transaction causation.”113 Within the
context of an omission, the Supreme Court has essentially
dispensed with the reliance requirement, holding that so long
as the omission was material, a presumption of reliance will be
made.114 Within the context of an affirmative misstatement,
reliance can be demonstrated by evidence showing that the
analyst’s report played a role in plaintiff’s decision to purchase
(or sell) the security in question.115 Absent such evidence, a
plaintiff could possibly enjoy a presumption of reliance under
the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine.116 “Under this doctrine,
plaintiffs are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of direct
reliance if they relied on the integrity of an efficient market
where face-to-face transactions do not occur.”117 An efficient
market, as explained previously, is one in which the price of a
security is affected by all publicly available material
information.118 By relying on the stock price, an investor in an
efficient market is (the argument goes) relying, in part, on
110

See Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1345 (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.,
223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).
111
See id.
112
See Gross, supra note 32, at 671.
113
See id.
114
See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972).
115
See Gross, supra note 32, at 671.
116
See id. at 672.
117
See id.
118
See supra Part I.A.
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analyst reports, even if he or she never read them, because the
information contained in such reports would have been
assimilated into the stock price.119 And, as one commentator
has concluded, “[s]ince virtually all securities covered by a
research analyst are traded in an efficient market, a plaintiff
could sue an analyst without the need to prove reliance.”120
Others, however, have questioned the availability of the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine to analyst statements.121 As
Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York explained:
[T]here is a qualitative difference between a statement of fact
emanating from an issuer and a statement of opinion emanating
from a research analyst. A well-developed efficient market can
reasonably be presumed to translate the former into an effect on
price, whereas no such presumption attaches to the latter. This, in
turn, is because statements of facts emanating from an issuer are
relatively fixed, certain, and uncontradicted. Thus, if an issuer says
its profits increased 10%, an efficient market, relying on that
statement, fixes a price accordingly. If later it is revealed that the
previous statement was untrue and that the profits only increased
5%, the market reaction is once again reasonably predictable and
ascertainable. . . .
As a result, no automatic impact on the price of a security can be
presumed and instead must be proven and measured before the
statement can be said to have defrauded the market in any material
way that is not simply speculative.122

Thus, for the largest class of potential plaintiffs (those
purchasers of a security who did not rely directly on the
defendant-analyst’s research report), the question of reliance is
119

See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
See Gross, supra note 32, at 672-73.
121
See, e.g., DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(questioning applicability of fraud-on-the-market theory in context of non-issuer
statements). In 2005, the Second Circuit indicated that it would review the
applicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to non-issuer statements. Pamela A.
MacLean, Investor Suits May Face New Challenge, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1. But
the court ultimately based its subsequent ruling on a finding that the IPO market
should not be considered efficient, and not on whether non-issuer statements can serve
as the basis of a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance. In re Initial Public Offerings
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2006). The court did opine, however, that “[i]t is
also doubtful whether the Basic [v. Levinson] presumption can be extended, beyond its
original context, to tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports.” Id.
at 43 (citing West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002)).
122
DeMarco, 222 F.R.D. at 246-47. But see id. at 246 (acknowledging that
there is evidence to suggest that “some research analysts may have the ability to
influence market prices on the basis of their recommendations”); SEC, Securities
Analyst Recommendations, http://www.sec.gov/answers/analyst.htm (last visited Sept.
10, 2007) (noting that “[a]nalyst recommendations can significantly move a company’s
stock price”).
120
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unsettled. But for investors who could prove that they did in
fact rely directly on an analyst’s reports, the reliance element
would clearly be met.
6. Loss Causation
Loss causation, for purposes of Rule 10b-5, is a “causal
link between the alleged misconduct and the economic harm
ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.”123 Ordinarily, loss
causation is calculated by examining the reaction of stock price
to the announcement or news rectifying the actionable
misstatement or omission in question.124 However, in most
analyst-conflict cases, the conflicts of interest and/or the
disingenuousness of opinions are discovered well after a
security’s price drops for other reasons.125 This makes it
exceedingly difficult for Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to demonstrate
loss causation within the context of analyst misconduct.126
Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, the element of loss
causation poses only a factual/pleading problem and does not
present a conceptual obstacle as applied to research analyst
misconduct.
7. Duty
Most courts and commentators have presumed that a
duty to disclose must exist before an investor can recover
damages under § 10(b) premised upon the omission of a
material fact.127 This presumption is based on the general
understanding that one ordinarily does not have a duty to
speak, and thus a lawsuit alleging fraudulent silence requires
the presence of some pre-existing duty.128 The basis of such a
duty within the context of analyst omissions is unclear.129
123

Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189,
197 (2d Cir. 2003).
124
See Moses, supra note 18, at 108.
125
See id. at 108-09.
126
See id. at 109-10; Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
127
E.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 574 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
128
See John J. Clark, Jr. & William F. Alderman, Potential Liabilities in
Initial Public Offerings, at 319, 347 (P.L.I. Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 1518, 2005) (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a failure to disclose
information allegedly withheld from the market unless the defendant was under a duty
to disclose the information at the time.”); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 234-35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it
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Other commentators, however, have pointed out that
the text of §10(b) does not require liability for an omission to be
conditioned upon a duty.130 As Professor Elizabeth Nowicki has
explained:
A close look at Section 10(b) . . . makes clear that Congress never
spoke of duty when crafting Section 10(b). There is no “duty”
prerequisite to the applicability of Section 10(b), nor is “duty” an
element of a successful Section 10(b) claim. . . . When Congress
drafted Section 10(b), Congress did not speak to the characteristics
of the target of Section 10(b)’s application. . . . All that matters is
that the . . . elements of a Section 10(b) claim are satisfied,
regardless of who is the defendant satisfying the elements.131

Regardless of whether such a duty exists, however, it is
fairly well established that once a party elects to make a
statement, Rule 10b-5 requires that such statement not omit
whatever material facts are necessary in order to make the
statement not misleading.132 Therefore, once an analyst decides
to communicate to investors (and potential investors) via a
research report, that report must not omit anything that would
cause its content to be misleading.133
B.

Analyst-Specific Regulatory Requirements

Prompted, in part, by the limitations of, and difficulties
of recourse to, Rule 10b-5 to address the problem of analyst
conflicts, the SEC and NASD have enacted regulations to
govern the conduct of research analysts: SEC Regulation AC
and NASD Rule 2711. As shall be seen, SEC Regulation AC
closes whatever loopholes might exist that would permit a
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there
can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”).
129
See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 428 (“The extent of an analyst’s duty to
disclose conflicts of interest to potential investors is unclear.”). It should be noted that
when the investor in question is a client of the analyst’s firm, the duty would appear to
exist. See id. As Professor Gross has explained, broker-dealers, including sell-side
analysts employed by them, “have a duty to deal fairly with their customers. This duty
of fair dealing encompasses the duty to give customers their undivided loyalty.” See
Gross, supra note 32, at 636.
130
See Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1314.
131
See id. at 1314, 1324. But see Sieland, supra note 15, at 550 (“[B]ecause
section 10(b) alleges fraud, there must be a duty extending from the defendant to the
plaintiff.”).
132
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.19 (5th
ed. 2005).
133
Id. As explained previously, whether an analyst’s failure to disclose a
conflict of interest constitutes an actionable omission under Rule 10b-5 is not entirely
certain. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
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research analyst to evade potential liability for issuing false
opinions and recommendations (by, for example, attempting to
rely on either the PSLRA’s safe harbor or the bespeaks caution
doctrine), and NASD Rule 2711 requires (of NASD members)
that companies adopt policies and procedures to address those
factors that give rise to an analyst’s conflicts of interest.
1. Regulation AC
SEC Regulation AC (“Analyst Certification”) requires
“all brokers, dealers, and certain other persons associated with
brokers and dealers to add certifications to their research
reports stating that the research analyst believes that the
report accurately reflects his or her personal views and
disclosing any compensation or other payments received in
connection with the recommendations or views.”134 Regulation
AC, therefore, addresses the dishonesty issue squarely, and
positively precludes a research analyst (via the certification
requirement) from setting forth an opinion or recommendation
that runs counter to his or her true beliefs—regardless of the
accuracy or completeness of the factual information contained
in the report, and regardless of any disclosure of the analyst’s
conflict(s) of interests. In light of Regulation AC, a research
analyst could not issue a fraudulent opinion and successfully
hide behind the fig leaf of full disclosure in an attempt to evade
sanction.
2. Rule 2711
Implemented in 2002 by the NASD, following SEC
approval, Rule 2711 mandates that NASD members implement
certain structural safeguards to diminish a research analyst’s
potential conflicts of interest.135 These safeguards include
prohibitions on promises of favorable research coverage by
investment banks to their clients (or potential clients),
prohibitions on submission of research reports to covered
company’s before publication, and prohibitions on investment
banking “supervision or control” over research analysts.136 Also
prohibited is basing analyst compensation on “any relationship
between the analyst’s research reports and investment banking
134
135
136

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1069.
See Hurt, supra note 29, at 779-81.
See id. at 780-81.
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clients.”137 Additionally, Rule 2711 requires an analyst to
disclose certain conflicts of interest in his or her research
reports, but it does not require the analyst to affirmatively
vouch for the authenticity of his or her opinions and/or
recommendations, as does SEC Regulation AC.138 Thus, Rule
2711 attempts to minimize the fundamental conflicts of interest
that give rise to research analyst misconduct via structural
changes and disclosure, but stops short of demanding that an
analyst certify the honesty and truthfulness of his or her
published recommendations and opinions.
C.

The Need for a Normative Analysis

Due to questions regarding, among other things, the
actionability of opinions in general, the materiality of analyst
opinions in particular, and the applicability of the fraud-on-themarket presumption in place of individualized reliance, Rule
10b-5’s ability to serve as a vehicle for imposing liability on
analysts for misstated opinions is questionable. This
questionability gave rise to the flurry of regulatory activity that
brought about Regulation AC and Rule 2711—each designed to
fill the perceived gap created by Rule 10b-5’s apparent inability
to police analyst conflicts of interest. But this begs an
interesting question: is Rule 10b-5’s apparent inability truly a
shortcoming? Perhaps the failure of the traditional elements of
Rule 10b-5 to cover the phenomenon of analyst fraud suggests
that such fraud ought not be subject to sanction. And, if not,
then Regulation AC and Rule 2711 could arguably cause more
harm than good. For these and similar questions, a normative
lens is needed through which securities law and policy can be
analyzed.
III.

NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOLUTIONS TO RESEARCH
ANALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The inadequacy of Rule 10b-5 to address the issue of
analyst conflicts of interest invites a discussion of other
potential solutions to this perceived problem. It also invites a
discussion of whether any solution should be adopted at all.
The business of dividing wheat from chaff, of judging various
solutions for appropriateness and efficacy, is obviously
137
138

See id. at 781.
See id. at 781-82; 17 C.F.R. § 242.501 (2005).
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predicated upon some standard (or set of standards) that
enables such judgments to be made. Economic analysis has
been heavily relied upon by those considering questions of
securities law, and such reliance seems most reasonable given
the direct role of U.S. securities law in regulating an important
part of the U.S. (and, indeed, the world’s) economy. In keeping
with this practice, this Part shall provide an economic analysis
of the problem of analyst conflicts (and of solutions proposed
thereto). But in a break from the common, this Part shall also
review the problem of analyst conflicts from another source of
standards and norms—those of the natural law tradition. As
indicated at the outset of this Article, this demonstration shall
reveal that a natural law approach to the problem of analyst
misconduct yields results and recommendations that comport
better with the philosophy of U.S. securities regulation than
does the law and economics approach.
Preliminary to a comparison of economics-based and
natural law-based approaches to the problem of analyst
conflicts, and an assessment of how these approaches comport
with the underlying philosophy of U.S. securities regulation, is,
of course, an identification of this underlying philosophy. Thus,
this Part commences with a brief review of the history of U.S.
federal securities regulation and an identification of the values
that undergird the regulatory approach.139
A.

Objectives and Values of U.S. Securities Laws

On the heels of the Stock Market Crash of the 1929 and
the Great Depression that followed, Franklin D. Roosevelt ran
a 1932 presidential campaign that included an attack on Wall
139
The federal securities laws (as do virtually all substantive laws) both
reflect and effectuate certain values or norms. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
203-04 (2d ed. 1994) (“The law of every modern state shows at a thousand points the
influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals.”); see also
CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW 95 (1999). Thus, when
ambiguities in the law must be resolved, or when decisions must be made regarding
the appropriate scope or application of the law, it is inevitable, fitting, and proper to
consult a broader source of norms to supplement, to the extent necessary, the moral
framework of the particular law in question. Cf. id. at 95 (observing that “all human
law enforces morality of some sort . . . . The question is therefore not whether the
human law should enforce morality but rather which morality it will, and should,
enforce.”); Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5,
8 (2003) (“[L]aw does shape what people believe and what they understand. Law has
power over people’s imaginations and how they think about what is happening in social
life. Law in this sense is more than a set of sanctions. It is a form of cultural software
that shapes the way we think about and apprehend the world.”).
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Street’s “unscrupulous money changers” who knew “only the
rules of a generation of self-seekers.”140 He pledged to “restore
[the] temple to the ancient truths,” including “honesty,”
“honor,” “the sacredness of obligations,” “faithful protection,”
and “unselfish performance.”141 Only upon such a restoration,
Roosevelt argued, could investor confidence, and thus the
capital markets, be resuscitated.142
Shortly after his inauguration, President Roosevelt
went to work on the “moral reform of Wall Street,” and early
SEC officials sought to restore “traditional standards of right
and wrong.”143 In Congress he had a willing partner and, in
short time, the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act were passed.144 In passing this legislation,
Congress, as one commentator has remarked, “was attempting
to improve the morality of the marketplace.”145 And as John H.
Walsh (former Chief Counsel in the SEC’s Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examination) explains, the moral vision that
inspired the Securities Acts were not lost upon those initially
chosen to oversee the newly implemented regulatory regime:
•

Baldwin B. Bane, Chief of the Securities Division of
the Federal Trade Commission (the agency initially
responsible for administering the Securities Act),
stated that the recently passed securities legislation
was “based on a ‘moral ideal.’ It was the ‘realization
that [the economy’s] ills [were] due . . . to the
weakening of [the nation’s] moral fibre, [and] to easy
temporizing with traditional and tried standards of
right and wrong.’”146

•

Joseph P. Kennedy, the first Chairman of the SEC,
said that the SEC’s most important objective was

140
John H. Walsh, A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose
Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1036
(2001).
141
Id.
142
See id.
143
Id. at 1037-42, 1070.
144
Id. at 1042-52.
145
David Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor
Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621, 622 (1970).
146
See Walsh, supra note 140, at 1054 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
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“spiritual,” and that it sought “to prevent vice” in the
securities industry.147
•

John Burns, the first General Counsel of the SEC,
proclaimed that the “failure of morals and religion to
put a bridle to the acquisitive motive[s] of . . .
business . . . made the intervention of the law
inevitable.”148

A moral prescription for economic ills was not seen as
inapposite given the understanding that a more ethical
securities industry would improve investor confidence and, in
turn, improve the capital markets.149 As the drafters of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act explained:
[i]f investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges
and corporations alike, the law must advance. . . . [I]t becomes a
condition of the very stability of that society that its rules of law and
of business practice recognize and protect . . . ordinary citizen’s
dependent position. Unless constant extension of the legal
conception of a fiduciary relationship—a guarantee of “straight
shooting”—supports the constant extension of mutual confidence
which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic
system, easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is
a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that system. When
everything everyone owns can be sold at once, there must be
confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid
and complicated, an economic system must become more moderate,
more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting.150

From this statement can be gleaned the interrelated
concerns and insights of the architects of the U.S. securities
regulatory regime. Investor protection and the health of the
capital markets were objectives of paramount concern;
necessary to the ascertainment of these objectives was the
restoration of certain virtues to the U.S. economic system—
namely, moderation, honesty, and trustworthiness.151 More
recently, the Second Circuit has opined that Congress passed
147

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1052-53.
149
See id. at 1036.
150
Nowicki, supra note 107, at 1312 (quoting Report to Accompany S. 3420,
Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72d Cong., S. Rep. No. 792 (Apr. 17, 1934))
(alterations in original).
151
See id. As recently as 1997 Congress echoed the fundamental purposes of
U.S. securities regulation: “to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the
securities markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and investment may
grow for the benefit of all Americans.” Joint Statement, supra note 93, at 41.
148
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the 1934 Securities Exchange Act “to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities
transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over
the counter, or on exchanges”152—thereby summarizing a
primary purpose of the securities laws as the achievement of
“fairness.” 153
Pursuant to the wisdom that “[s]unlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman,”154 Congress opted, primarily, for a regime of
mandatory disclosure to achieve its legislative ends.155 As one
commentator has explained:
When promulgating the federal securities acts, Congress examined
different theories of securities regulation, and ultimately chose a
licensing scheme that embraced a fundamental purpose . . . to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.156

Full disclosure, however, for all its fundamentality to
the U.S. approach to securities regulation is, of course, not the
sole mechanism relied upon by Congress to protect investors.
At the forefront of enactments supplementing the disclosure
regime are Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.157 These
antifraud provisions go beyond disclosure alone and directly
ban the issuance of false statements and deceptive omissions in
securities trading—regardless of whether these statements and
omissions concern mandatorily disclosed information.158 Thus,
152

SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id.
154
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1914).
155
See Leonard J. DePasquale, Helping to Ameliorate the Doctrine of Caveat
Emptor in the Securities Market: Reves v. Ernst & Young, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 893,
896 (1992).
156
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
157
See supra Part II.A.
158
It could be asserted that the prevailing modern approach to securities
regulation cares less about truthfulness per se in light of the advent of the bespeaks
caution doctrine and the PSLRA’s safe harbor (especially within the context of “soft”
information such as opinions and forecasts). However, one must be careful not to read
too much into the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine. Although they may
technically grant a “license to lie,” see Brooks & Wang, supra note 85, at 4, they more
properly are read as efforts at encouraging the dissemination of non-required
disclosure by creating a zone of safety to protect against litigation and liability. Akin to
“good Samaritan laws,” the purpose of which is not to protect those who would literally
kick a victim while he or she was down, but rather to free would-be rescuers from the
153
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although eschewing an approach of requiring minimum
solvency standards for companies whose securities are
purchased and sold (which characterized the approach taken by
state securities laws at the time), Congress did require that
investors be provided with certain key pieces of information,
and that all the information furnished to investors (whether
required or not) in connection with the purchase or sale of
security be complete and accurate.159
Applying the objectives, values, and philosophy of the
securities laws to the question of research analyst conflicts
certainly confirms that the issue is correctly identified as a
problem to be addressed. Investors have been hurt, confidence
in the market has been compromised, and whether long-term
harm to economic growth shall result from this remains to be
seen. As for the most appropriate response to this problem, we
shall now turn to the analytic tools of the economics and
natural law reasoning.
B.

Law and Economics Analysis
1. Law and Economics Generally

One of the most powerful approaches in the analysis of
law in recent decades is that offered by economics, commonly
referred to as “law and economics” or an “economic analysis of
the law.” Few such approaches have had such impact on legal
scholarship and thought, and few subjects are more

risk of liability, the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine aim at removing the
liability-risk disincentive against those who, in good faith, would like to go beyond the
bare minimum disclosure requirements of the securities laws but are fearful of doing
so. Understanding this context helps disabuse one of any notion that Congress and the
courts have moved away from a model of investor protection based on the coupling of
disclosure with an antifraud rule; rather, Congress and the courts are merely seeking
to promote the release of supplemental, “soft information” by making it more difficult
to hold good faith suppliers of such information liable merely for estimating or
forecasting incorrectly. Indeed, Congress’s expressed purpose in passing the PSLRA’s
safe harbor was, in part, to “enhance market efficiency.” Joint Statement, supra note
93, at 52. As the promulgation of false or misleading information does not enhance
market efficiency (and may, in fact, harm market efficiency, see Fisch & Sale, supra
note 10, at 1086), the arguable protection of authors of such information from liability
should be interpreted as a necessary evil at best, and not as a statement of change in
philosophy or policy.
159
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26-27.
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appropriately analyzed under the lens of economics than the
securities laws.160
The economic approach to the law embraces, as given,
the fundamental premises of the free market economy: that
individuals are rational beings who predictably pursue their
self-interest and, in doing so, generally serve to maximize
society’s creation of wealth.161 The objective of law, therefore
(under a law and economics approach), is to establish rules that
assist society to so function (largely by addressing market
failures and minimizing transaction costs) in order to maximize
societal wealth (often referred to as promoting “efficiency”).162
This line of reasoning has led some scholars to argue that
“properly understood, securities regulation is not a consumer
protection law,” but rather a regime concerned with
“facilitate[ing] a competitive market for information traders.”163
Thus, applied to the research analyst conflicts-ofinterest issue, the law and economics approach frankly
suggests disregarding the promotion of virtue, the extirpation
of vice, even “investor protection” as goals per se, and instead
aims simply at increasing market efficiency by reducing
transaction costs and correcting for market failures.164
2. Law and Economics Applied
In order to facilitate a law and economics review of the
research analyst conflict-of-interest problem, solutions (both
potential and applied) to the problem have been sorted into
160
Cf. David B. Sentelle, Law and Economics Should Be Used for Economic
Questions, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 (1997) (arguing that the judiciary’s use
of economic analysis should be limited to questions properly pertaining to economics).
161
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 1011 (3d ed. 2003); J.M. ROBERTS, THE PELICAN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 675 (1983).
162
See Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics:
The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 44445 (2004); Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Virtue: Morality and Productivity in Posner’s
Theory of Wealth Maximization, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 167, 171 (1993); POLINSKY, supra
note 161, at 7.
163
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation 1 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n 15th Annual Meeting Working Paper No. 9,
2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/art9. Lending anecdotal support to
this position (within the context of research reports, at least), is the proclamation of at
least one prominent analyst that her audience is not the individual investor, but rather
“professional money managers” and institutions. See Sieland, supra note 15, at 545.
164
See POLINSKY, supra note 161, at 7. A dichotomy exists between positive
(purely descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) approaches. See id. at xvii. As may
have already been discerned, the approach taken (and critiqued) in this Article shall be
normative (prescriptive).
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four general categories: (1) a laissez-faire approach, (2) an
antifraud rule, (3) mandatory disclosure, and (4) a structural
approach. The merit of each of these categories shall be
assessed, in turn, from a law and economics perspective.
a. Laissez-Faire Approach
Under a laissez faire approach to the problem of analyst
misconduct, no legal rule would be adopted to address the
conflict of interest problem. Instead, the market would be
expected to most efficiently address this issue.165
As there are costs associated with the disclosure of
information, any fixed rule regarding disclosure is bound to
require either too little or too great an amount of disclosure.166
This is because rules are bound to be imperfect, if for no other
reason than the fact that rules are fairly static and the
demands of the market are dynamic.167 Sub-optimal levels of
disclosure extract an unnecessary cost on disclosing parties
and, consequently, on the market as a whole. Assuming a
properly functioning, competitive market, the optimal level of
disclosure, just as the optimal price of a good or service, should
be set by the market through competition.168
Much literature has been generated over the issue of the
optimal level of corporate disclosure under the securities
laws.169 The focus of this literature, however, has almost
invariably been disclosure on the part of issuers of securities
for the purpose of attracting investment (either primarily,
through disclosure sufficient to support an offering, or
secondarily, through disclosure sufficient to maintain a healthy
secondary market for the issuer’s securities).170 The need to
attract investment (and maintain a healthy secondary market)
creates competition among corporate issuers for investors.171
This competition encourages issuers to disclose the optimal
165

Cf. Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, Tort Law and Economics, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 6 (forthcoming).
166
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000).
167
Cf. David Van Drunen, Aquinas and Hayek on the Limits of Law: A
Convergence of Ethical Traditions, J. MARKETS & MORALITY, Fall 2002, at 315, 327
(observing the inability “to legislate a system of law that cleanly resolves all future
matters of conflict” ).
168
See id.
169
See, e.g., id.; see also Palmiter, supra note 78.
170
E.g., Palmiter, supra note 78.
171
See id.
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level of information necessary to investors—that is, just enough
information to attract the required amount of investment.172
The provision of less information would cause investors to
eschew the putative issuer in favor of competing issuers’
securities; the provision of more information would be
unnecessary and therefore wasteful at best.173 As for the quality
of the information provided (in terms of accuracy and honesty),
the market would punish an issuer who disclosed false or
misleading information by devaluing the price of its future
offerings on account of a lack of trust. Thus, there is an
economic incentive for issuers to make disclosures that are
accurate as well as sufficient.
With regard to research analyst reporting, a threshold
question from a law and economics perspective is whether
circumstances exist so as to justify departing from the
conclusion that market forces should result in an optimal state
of affairs. Put differently, one must consider whether research
reporting takes place within a properly functioning,
competitive market—an assumption that forms the basis for
the law and economics conclusion that market forces alone
should maximize societal wealth. The existence of serious
conflicts of interest challenges these assumptions.174
As explained previously, sell-side analyst reports are
usually provided free of charge to a bank’s customers.175 Thus,
such reports are part of the total mix of goods and services that
banks use to attract and maintain investor clients. The greater
the value that the market for investors assigns to these
reports, the more effective these reports will be in attracting
and maintaining investor clients and, consequently, all things
being equal, the more competitive their issuing bank will be.
However, as has also been previously discussed, analyst
reports serve (or traditionally have served) at least one
additional purpose: the promotion of the securities offerings of
a bank’s investment-banking clients in order to attract and
maintain such clients.176 Again, the investment-banking market
will assign a value to these reports relative to their worth to
investment banking clients, and the higher the value, all
172

See id.
See id.
174
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
175
See supra text accompanying note 13.
176
See supra Part I.B.
173
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things being equal, the more competitive the investmentbanking franchise of the bank issuing the research reports will
be.
Conventional wisdom posits that the cross-purposes
served by research reports give rise to a classic conflict of
interest.177 However, scrutiny reveals that the dual purposes of
the research reports arguably work in tandem to compel
optimal levels of disclosure and accuracy. For what
distinguishes a research report from mere marketing material
is its aura of objectivity and the quality of data contained
therein (especially the underlying factual data). The only
divergence created by the different purposes of research
reporting is that whereas investor clients want objective,
honest research reports, investment-banking clients care more
about the perception of objective, honest research reports
(coupled with their more pressing desire for positive research
coverage). Since, presumably, the best way of developing and
maintaining such a perception is to actually publish objective,
honest research reports, banks have an incentive to act
accordingly for the benefit of each identified category of clients.
To the extent that an analyst is caught behaving dishonestly,
his or her personal integrity would be tarnished, along with
(possibly) the integrity of the bank for which he or she works.
The result would be a decline in the market value of the bank’s
research reports to both investor and investment-banking
clients. In short, as “[r]eputation remains the lifeblood for [the
financial
industry]
firm,
often
overwhelming
other
incentives,”178 it appears as though the market should
sufficiently check egregious analyst misbehavior.
And to the extent that analysts spin or skew their
reports in order to satisfy their banking clients, it could be
argued that the cost of this dishonesty is more than offset by
the tremendous market benefits provided by the voluminous
accurate financial and statistical data that research analysts
unearth and include in their reports.179 Moreover, research
suggests that market participants are largely aware of this
lack of complete candor on the part of sell-side research
analysts, as reports issued by bank-affiliated analysts are
valued less by individual investors than reports issued by
177

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1047.
See Palmiter, supra note 78, at 112.
179
Perhaps such spin or skew could be analogized to the commercials that one
must endure in order to enjoy the desired content contained in free radio broadcasts.
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independent research firms.180 This is despite the fact that, as
research also suggests, analyst reports issued by bankingaffiliated analysts are of higher quality than reports issued by
independent research firms.181 Additionally, through the use of
brokers, investors should be able to avoid investing on the basis
of unsupportable recommendations and instead invest upon
quality factual data. Thus, it could be argued that the conflicts
of interest commonly alleged are largely illusory and, in any
event, result in negligible harm to the market.
However, notwithstanding the market incentives in
favor of honest research reporting, and notwithstanding the
ability of investors (and brokers) to discount for the possibility
of bias, the fact remains that certain analysts have published
persuasively dishonest research reports, and apparently
certain individual investors, perhaps unaware of the conflicts
of interest on the part of the researcher whose report they are
reading, claim to have placed unwarranted (in retrospect)
levels of reliance on these reports. Additionally, some scholars
have argued that false opinions and recommendations are not
properly discounted by the market, but rather do harm to the
accuracy of stock pricing (and therefore undermine market
efficiency).182
But simply with regard to the issue of misled investors:
can such investors be sacrificed even if this redounds to the
greater good of the securities market as a whole (that is, even if
the optimal level of disclosure and honesty can be established
by the market)? Perhaps here the potential advice of the
economist and the mandates of the securities laws most clearly
diverge. For it was Congress’s explicit desire to displace the
“laissez-faire” model that predated the 1933/1934 Securities
Acts with one that mandated fixed disclosure and required
certain minimum levels of investor protection.183 A laissez-faire
approach, therefore, fails to honor either concern. Thus, even if
such an approach may indeed maximize wealth (itself a goal of
the securities laws), it does so at the expense of other, more
pressing goals (primarily, investor protection), and is in
contravention of the fundamental values (such as honesty and
fairness) inherent in the securities laws.

180
181
182
183

See Moses, supra note 18, at 90-91.
See Jacob et al., supra note 11, at 32.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086.
See supra text accompanying note 156.
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b. Antifraud Rule Approach
One alternative to a laissez-faire approach would be the
imposition of an antifraud rule applicable to fraudulently
issued analyst opinions.184 Whether via the imposition of civil,
regulatory, or criminal liability, the rule would simply punish
(in one way or another) a research analyst who sets forth
opinions and/or recommendations that he or she does not
actually believe. Because of their functional equivalency,
certification requirements, such as Regulation AC, are included
in this category,185 along with Professors Fisch and Sale’s
suggestion that a “duty of reliability” for research analysts be
recognized.186 The rule could also force research analysts to
disclose their conflicts of interest, out of fear that neglecting to
do so could constitute a fraudulent omission.187
An antifraud rule could reasonably be expected to
reduce the issuance of false opinions on the part of analysts, as,
in economic terms, it increases the cost of issuing such opinions
via the threat of punishment and/or liability for such
opinions.188 But, as indicated earlier, market forces alone
should also serve to reduce, to an extent, the issuance of false
opinions.189 Thus, the marginal benefit of an antifraud rule,
with regard to its role in reducing the issuance of false
opinions, appears likely to be small.
A more substantial benefit, perhaps, flowing from an
antifraud rule would be the enhanced credibility (and thus
increased value) it would arguably bestow upon analyst
opinions. For in the presence of an antifraud rule applicable to
analyst opinions, investors would be able to rely more heavily
upon such opinions, thereby increasing the value of these
opinions.190
Weighed against the potential benefits of an antifraud
rule applicable to analysts are its significant costs: the
184

See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 27-29.
See supra Part II.B.1.
186
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1081-88 (recommending liability for
research analysts whose reports contain recommendations “that would not have been
issued by a reasonable person”).
187
See supra Part II.A.1. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of
compelling such disclosure, see infra Part III.B.2.c.
188
See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 27-29.
189
See supra Part III.B.2.a.
190
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-80 (1984) (discussing economic effect
of antifraud rules).
185
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potential chilling effect on the issuance of research reports that
such a rule would likely have.191 Exposure to potential liability
for fraudulent opinions (or material omissions) in research
reports can be expected to decrease the issuance of such
reports, by both banks responsible for the issuance of reports
that contain exaggerated or otherwise dishonest statements of
opinion and by banks responsible for the issuance of reports
that are completely genuine. With regard to the latter, an
inevitable fear will develop on the part of banks that
statements of opinion in research reports, even if entirely
honest and truthful, may nevertheless subject the bank to
litigation if time were to demonstrate that the opinion was illfounded or mistaken. Regardless of the likely failure of such
litigation (as we are assuming here that the opinions in
question were genuine and published in good faith), the mere
commencement of even an unsuccessful litigation can be
expensive and time consuming, and this risk of litigation
becomes a cost associated with the promulgation of research
reports.192 Of course, this is a cost that accompanies practically
any antifraud rule and not one unique to its application within
this context. However, given the precarious economics of the
research analyst business model, under which the full value of
research reports to the marketplace arguably exceeds the
revenues they are able to generate for their sponsoring firms,
the additional costs imposed by an antifraud rule could tip the
balance against their continued sponsorship to the detriment of
the market as a whole.193
With regard to research reports that contain
disingenuous statements of opinion, an antifraud rule will, of
course, deter the publication of these as well. And although
that is instinctively viewed as a good thing, additional scrutiny
will reveal that even this effect is not without certain potential
negative consequences. As has been discussed previously,
banks have traditionally issued research reports with two key
191
See Joint Statement, supra note 91, at 52-53 (expressing concern over the
“muzzling effect of abusive securities litigation”).
192
See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
683 (Senate Report accompanying passage of PSLRA addressing problem of “frivolous
‘strike’ suits alleging violations of the Federal securities laws in the hope that
defendants will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation”: “These suits, which
unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital and chill corporate disclosure, are
often based on nothing more than a company’s announcement of bad news, not
evidence of fraud.”).
193
Cf. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 274-76 (2003).
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audiences in mind: their investor clients and their investment
banking clients.194 Since these reports are ordinarily provided
free of charge, the costs of their production are indirectly
covered by the revenues they assist in generating from each of
these client groups.195 As precluding exaggeration, hyperbole,
and other disingenuous statements of opinion diminishes the
value of these reports to the bank’s investment banking clients,
banks may be less inclined to issue these reports,196 thereby
reducing the dissemination of the otherwise valuable
accompanying factual information regarding the covered
company. In short, it might be better in general for the market
to have more reports circulating (including tainted reports that
contain an admixture of accurate factual data alongside
disingenuous opinions and recommendations) versus a smaller
number of completely trustworthy (or more trustworthy)
reports.197
These concerns suggest that, from an economics
perspective, efforts to curb research analyst dishonesty resist
resorting to antifraud rules.198 But the absence of an antifraud
rule directed against dishonest analysts seems incongruous
with the philosophy of federal securities regulation on at least
two grounds. First, given the importance of honesty, fairness,
and trustworthiness to the drafters of the U.S. Securities
Acts, the absence of any rule prohibiting fraudulent misconduct
on the part of analysts, so as to allow a modicum of dishonesty
in research reporting, would appear to be a glaring
inconsistency. Second, reliance on market mechanisms to
minimize fraudulent analyst misconduct, although wellfounded, nevertheless appears insufficient; although market
mechanisms would most likely serve to protect most investors,
knowledge of the fact that an antifraud rule would serve to
further reduce fraudulent misconduct, and serve to protect all
(or at least more) investors199 from such misconduct, makes it
194

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
See Choi & Fisch, supra note 193, at 274-76 (2003).
196
Unless, perhaps, their enhanced value to their investor clients, as a result
of the antifraud rule, outweighs this diminishment in value to the investment banking
clients. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 28-29.
197
But see Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086 (arguing that analyst reports
that contain misstatements of opinions distort stock prices (rather than enhance
market efficiency)).
198
But see Palmiter, supra note 78, at 135.
199
Either prospectively, via the reduction of fraud, or retrospectively, via the
provision of clear and certain remedies to victims of fraud.
195
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difficult to square the absence of such a rule with the strong
(if not overriding) concerns over investor protection that
characterize the U.S. regime of securities regulation.
c. Mandatory Disclosure
Another approach to the problem of analyst conflicts is
to mandate the disclosure of conflicts of interest.200 In the
absence of an antifraud rule extending to analysts’ opinions,
mandatory disclosure could approximate a regime in which the
bespeaks caution doctrine and/or the safe harbor of the PSLRA
foreclosed liability for those analysts who issued false or
misleading opinions, but who also fully (and truthfully)
disclosed their conflicts of interest.201 Coupled with an antifraud
rule, mandatory disclosure is likely to have little marginal
effect if, as expected, the antifraud rule would serve to compel
disclosure of conflicts of interest out of a fear that
nondisclosure of such conflicts would be actionable.202 However,
if, as suggested, the nondisclosure of an analyst’s conflicts of
interest might not actually be properly considered an omission
which makes the other statements contained in the research
report misleading,203 then a disclosure rule would close this
loophole and clearly expose to liability those analysts who did
not disclose their conflicts (similar to the effects of Regulation
AC and NASD Rule 2711).204
Although mandatory disclosure has been widely
criticized from an economics perspective as generating
inefficiencies,205 some have justified mandatory disclosure from
an economics perspective as a means of reducing wasteful
“agency costs”206 and duplicative research efforts on the part of

200

See Gross, supra note 32, at 661-62.
See supra Part IIA.2.
202
See supra Part III.B.2.b.
203
See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
204
See supra Part II.B.
205
See supra Part III.A.1
206
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1039. Agency costs are those costs
associated with, among other things, monitoring and verifying the behavior of those
individuals who are purportedly acting on one’s behalf. These costs are not otherwise
productive, and the benefit of their reduction via a rule of mandatory disclosure would
rebound to the market as a whole. See id.; see generally Eric A. Posner, Agency Models
in Law and Economics (U Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
92, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.ta?abstrat_id=204872.
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investors.207 And unlike mandatory disclosure in the context of
a stock issuer’s financial reporting (which is the focus of most
economic-based criticism concerning mandatory disclosure
rules), the cost of disclosing the existence of possible conflicts of
interest on the part of a research analyst would be relatively
small. A rule requiring mandatory disclosure of analyst
conflicts would reduce the need for investors to do their own
investigation regarding such conflicts before relying upon
research reports.208 The greater and more specific the
mandatory disclosure, the less work an individual investor
would have to do (and the less agency costs he or she would
have to bear) to uncover the same information. And because
the disclosure contained in one report could, arguably, reduce
agency costs for thousands of individual investors, the
argument in favor of such mandatory disclosure is compelling:
the costs of its inclusion in the report would appear to be
outweighed by the benefits bestowed upon the investing
public.209
As previously discussed,210 a regime of mandatory
disclosure is precisely the means selected by Congress to
regulate the securities industry. Therefore, requiring analysts
to disclose their conflicts of interest would be a solution that
apparently passes muster under the philosophy of U.S.
securities regulation and, as has been seen, can be justified
from an economics perspective.
d. Structural Approach
A fourth approach suggested by some is structural: to
attack the analyst’s conflict of interest directly by forcing
structural changes to the securities industry that minimize the
factors giving rise to the conflict.211 This is the approach
embodied in NASD’s Rule 2711.212
Obviously, the structural approach proceeds under the
assumption that by eliminating conflicts of interest, research
analysts will be made more independent and the quality of

207
See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public
Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 89 (2006).
208
See Posner, supra note 206, at 1.
209
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 163, at 24-27.
210
See supra Part III.B.1.
211
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 16, at 433.
212
See supra Part II.B.2.

134

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

opinions and recommendations contained in their research
reports will improve. Although this assumption may be
intuitive, at least one study suggests that analysts at
independent research firms make earnings forecasts that are
inferior to those of analysts associated with investment
banks.213 This may be because bank-affiliated researchers have
more resources at their disposal214—resources generated, in
part, by the bank’s calibration of their research reports to
optimize value among both their investor clients and
investment banking clients.215 And by inefficiently decreasing
the value that a bank can obtain for its banking clients by
removing (or reducing) investment banking considerations
from the production of research reports, a structural approach
may share the same basic deficiency of the antifraud rule
approach: it decreases the value of analyst reporting to banks,
which in turn will diminish the sponsorship of reporting on the
part of banks, ultimately decreasing the flow of valuable
information to the market.216 Thus, as with an antifraud rule, a
structural remedy would most likely be disfavored under a law
and economics approach. This is because other solutions
(namely, either a market solution or a rule mandating
disclosure of conflicts) appear to offer similar benefits, while
imposing lower potential costs on the securities markets.
Reliance on a structural remedy to the problem of
analyst conflicts is neither compelled, nor precluded, by the
philosophy of U.S. securities regulation. As Congress opted
largely for disclosure and antifraud rules in promulgating a
scheme of securities regulation, it cannot be said that failure to
promote a structural solution is at odds with the U.S.
regulatory approach. On the other hand, the Glass-Steagal Act
(the Banking Act of 1933), which precluded commercial banks
from engaging in investment banking and brokerage activities,
provides clear precedent for a structural remedy were such a
remedy deemed advisable.217

213
See Jacob et al., supra note 11, at 32; see also Choi & Fisch, supra note 193,
at 274-76, 285.
214
See Jacob et al., supra note 11, at 32.
215
See supra Part III.B.2.a.
216
See Choi & Fisch, supra note 193, at 274 (“Eliminating intermediary
conflicts is a flawed solution . . . . Someone has to pay for intermediary services, and
eliminating conflicts may block an important source of financing.”).
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Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
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3. Summary of the Law and Economics Approach
A law and economics approach could be expected to
embrace a laissez-faire approach to analyst fraud, which would
equate to a regime under which Rule 10b-5 liability would not
be applicable to research analyst misstatements of opinion, and
under which Regulation AC and Rule 2711 would not be
present. That said, a rule of mandatory disclosure, under which
analysts would be obliged to disclose their conflicts of interest,
could be justified under law and economics grounds, given the
benefits of such disclosure in comparison to its costs. A general
antifraud rule applicable to analyst opinions and
recommendations would be disfavored due to its chilling effect
on analyst speech (both generally and, arguably, even with
regard to the skewed opinions that help make the preparation
and promulgation of research reports beneficial to the banks
that issue them), and a structural remedy would most likely be
rejected as violating the presumptively most efficient way (that
is, the market-derived way) of generating research reports.
C.

Natural Law Analysis

As previously acknowledged, the securities laws invite
an economically oriented review by virtue of the important
role they play in regulating the U.S. economy.218 There are,
however, numerous other sources of reasoning or norms 219
to which one may turn for assistance in the interpretation and
formulation of securities law.220 Of these, “natural law”
is particularly appropriate and helpful. Although a
comprehensive articulation and defense of natural law theory221
218

See supra Part III.B.
See Posner, supra note 2, at 166-67. See generally Robert H. Nelson,
Economic Religion Versus Christian Values, 1 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 142, 154 (1998)
(“Economics offers a worldview of its own . . . . Economics is thus part of an overall
value system, really a theology of a secular sort.”).
220
See, e.g., Basant K. Kapur, Harmonization Between Communitarian Ethics
and Market Economics, 2 J. MARKETS & MORALITY, (1999) 35, 38-39, 50 nn.18-22
(identifying Biblical, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian sources of ethics).
221
At this point, a distinction should be noted between “natural law” on the
one hand and natural law theories, perspectives, reasoning, and thinking on the other.
It is one thing to assert (or assume) that natural law exists, it is quite another to assert
(or assume) that certain principles, values, or norms are part of, or derived from, the
natural law. This Article assumes that natural law exists, and shall draw upon the
thinking of those who have articulated the traditional understanding of what the
content and implications of the natural law are believed to be. Thus, properly speaking,
this final part of this Article discusses and applies natural law theory and natural law
219
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is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief overview of natural
law theory, along with a more thorough presentation of those
components of natural law thinking most applicable is in order
and shall be provided.222 As shall be seen, a natural law
approach to the problem of analyst conflicts differs significantly
from a law and economics approach, in terms of both the ends
pursued and the means employed. With regard to ends,
although a natural law approach does not dismiss the
important objectives of wealth maximization and efficiency,223
natural law does not view wealth maximization as the ultimate
(or only) societal goal. With regard to means employed,
although a natural law approach does not dispute the force of
self-interest, it recognizes other motivating factors upon
human behavior and, as such, considers a wider range of
possible mechanisms for influencing behavior. Taken together,
the natural law approach provides a broader set of factors to
consider in analyzing problems and proffering solutions.
Moreover, as the values and objectives of a natural law
approach are more congruent with the full set of values and
objectives that originally animated the securities laws, so too
are the solutions and approaches derived and endorsed via a
natural law perspective.
1. Why Natural Law?
Before delving into a substantive overview of natural
law theory, first consider the appropriateness of applying
natural law thinking to a securities law analysis. There are at
least five reasons for reviewing the problem of analyst conflicts
in particular, and issues of securities law in general, via a
natural law approach:
First, it is not unfair for proponents of law and
economics to demand a sparring partner whose arguments are
predicated upon reason and objectivity rather than feelings,
opinion, and subjectivity.224 Given the intellectual rigor and
thinking, and does not purport to discuss or apply natural law per se. See JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 25 (1980).
222
For an overview of natural law methods of analysis, see generally Randy E.
Barnett, A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 655 (1997). For a lengthier (but not too lengthy) defense of a natural law
approach to 21st century legal problems (albeit in the context of Contract law), see
HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY 173-78 (1999).
223
Indeed, the efficient allocation and utilization of resources, ceteris paribus,
is promoted by natural law proponents. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 221, at 111-12.
224
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2, at 166-73.
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rationality of natural law theory, and given the fact that for
centuries it has been subject to scrutiny, evaluation, and reevaluation by some of the greatest minds the world has ever
produced, no person of good will who professes a loyalty to
reason can deny that natural law philosophy meets this
standard.225
Second, natural law reasoning has been a force in
American political philosophy and jurisprudence since the
inception of the United States to the present,226 and this alone
suggests its appropriateness as a reference to assist in the
understanding and resolution of American legal controversies.
As Professor Kmiec has explained, “the American democracy
is . . . rooted in the natural law.”227
Third, although admittedly controversial in its
application to certain other fields of law,228 natural law thinking
is not often applied to economic-related fields of law such as
securities regulation, nor, moreover, can natural law readily be
categorized as “conservative” or “liberal,” “progressive,” or
“reactionary” with regard to its application in such an area.
Thus, application of natural law to the problem of analyst
conflicts offers a perspective that is challengingly unfamiliar to
many (if not most) in the field of securities law and, perhaps,
less likely to be viewed askance or otherwise discounted as a
vehicle for a particular political agenda.
Fourth, as one proponent of natural law reasoning has
explained, the use of natural law philosophy in legal analysis is
a refreshingly ambitious alternative to those more “realistic”
approaches to legal analysis employed in our “age of prosaic
undertakings.”229 Put differently, a natural law approach, as
opposed to a law and economics approach and some other
modern theories of jurisprudence, allows us to once again focus
the law explicitly on normative ends.
Fifth, and perhaps most compelling, natural law
thinking meshes extraordinarily well with the seminal values
that produced the securities laws.230 For the virtues identified
225

See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
See RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 402-12 (3d ed. 1991).
See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism—Or Why Justice Scalia
(Almost) Gets It Right, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627 (1997) (discussing the natural
law underpinnings of the U.S. Constitution).
227
See Kmiec, supra note 226, at 636.
228
See, e.g., RICE, supra note 139, at 25.
229
See A.P. D’ENTRÈVES, NATURAL LAW 93-94 (2d ed. 1970).
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See supra Part III.A.
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by Congress as necessary to the ends of the securities laws
(namely, moderation, honesty, and trustworthiness231), and the
Second Circuit’s summary of the securities laws as ordered to
“fairness,”232 echo principles of natural law (even if not
consciously based upon such principles). And, whereas there
are multiple methods of achieving the ends of the securities
laws, the means chosen should be consonant with the values
inherent in these laws. Since natural law philosophy shares the
values previously identified as central to the securities laws,
under a natural law approach, one shall be spared the
predicament of a solution that furthers one of the ends of the
securities laws while simultaneously undermining the laws’
other ends, values, or philosophical underpinnings.
2. Natural Law Generally
a. Natural Law Defined
There are multiple competing theories of natural law.233
Fortunately, much of what follows is shared by most (if not all)
of these theories. Where divergences do occur, I have adopted
what is commonly characterized as the “virtue ethics” school of
natural law, which was originally developed by Aristotle and
the ancient Greeks, and most thoroughly expounded upon and
augmented by St. Thomas Aquinas.234
At the core of natural law philosophy is the notion that
reason can lead us to grasp certain fundamental truths about
ourselves as human beings and, consequently, about society as
well.235 Armed with the knowledge of these truths, further
reasoning should enable us to derive rules and principles of
conduct best suited to our human nature—that is, rules and
principles of conduct that will promote individual virtue (or

231

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968).
233
See generally Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory: The Modern Tradition, in
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61-103 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (providing an overview of the various theories of natural law).
234
For a short summary of virtue ethics, see Virtue Ethics, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
ethics-virtue/. For a more thorough treatment of the subject, see generally ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS (2d ed. 1998); RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE,
INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUE ETHICS (2002).
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See FINNIS, supra note 221, at 23-24.
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morality) and societal justice.236 And by complying with these
rules and principles (and only by complying with these rules
and principles), human beings are capable of achieving
“eudaimonia”—true human flourishing.237
Natural law’s pedigree is long and illustrious; its
various permutations can trace their roots back to ancient
Greece, and its influence continues to be felt over the most
important issues of our present day:
[Natural law is] a philosophical theory stretching back to Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle, propounded by the Stoics, developed anew by
medieval churchmen like Aquinas, elaborated in secular terms by
Protestant jurists like Grotius and Pufendorf, reshaped238 to justify
“natural rights” by Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson and Adams, and
invoked in the cause of racial equality by Abraham Lincoln, the Rev.
Martin Luther King Jr. and . . . Thurgood Marshall.239

Finally, it should be noted that, although perhaps most
often associated with Aquinas (who set forth the most
complete, systematic exposition of natural law in the Summa
Theologica240), natural law philosophy need not be predicated
upon, and is not dependent upon, any particular religion or
theology,241 as even natural law’s critics have come to observe.242

236
See D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 92-93, 110-11; see also FINNIS, supra
note 221, at 23-24.
237
See Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS.
L. REV. 679, 689.
238
Arguably, “reshaped” is a euphemism here; perhaps a better term would be
“radically transformed.” See, e.g., JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 59 (Doris C. Anson trans., 1943) (commenting that eighteenth-century natural
law theory “more or less deformed” classical natural law theory). Nevertheless, the key
point remains: the concept of a natural law, in its various permutations, has served as
a wellspring of Western thought and inspiration.
239
Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at 9; see also Bix, supra
note 233, at 61-63.
240
See Bix, supra note 233, at 61-62; see also Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural
Rights Derive From Natural Law?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 704 (1997) (“There
were, to be sure, natural-law doctrines prior to Thomas Aquinas, but none so elaborate,
so detailed, or so philosophically successful.”).
241
See A.P. D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 53 (noting Grotius’s “famous
dictum that natural law would retain its validity even if God did not exist”).
242
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 187 (2d ed. 1994) (“Natural Law
has, however, not always been associated with belief in a Divine Governor or Lawgiver
of the universe, and even where it has been, its characteristic tenets have not been
logically dependent on that belief.”).
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b. Virtue and Eudaimonia
As stated, from a natural law perspective, the ultimate
goal (or end) of human existence is “eudaimonia”—a term used
by Aristotle to denote true human flourishing (sometimes
translated more simply as “happiness”).243 This immediately
presents a contrast with the focus of law and economics, which
does not recognize a unique end of human existence, but rather
strives toward whatever ends an individual (or collection of
individuals) chooses to pursue.244 Although both economics and
natural law assume that individuals pursue “the good,” each
defines “the good” quite differently. Under natural law
philosophy, the good is an objective truth knowable by reason
that is independent of an individual’s personal preferences;
under economic theory, only preferences are knowable, and the
good is defined as that which satisfies an individual’s
preferences. Thus, the good has no meaning in economics
without reference to preferences, whereas to natural law
theorists what an individual prefers is not the same as what is
truly good for him or her. So, although under natural law
thinking, one can state that a particular individual prefers a
particular thing that is not truly good for him or her, under
economic thinking such a statement would be paradoxical.245
Regarding the concept of efficiency, although a natural
law approach would generally eschew wastefulness and share
in the economist’s desire to promote efficiency and maximize
wealth,246 natural law theory does not elevate efficiency and
wealth maximization to the status that law and economics
elevates them; rather, natural law theory subordinates the
concerns of efficiency and wealth maximization to the

243
Mark A. Sargent, Utility, The Good, And Civic Happiness: A Catholic
Critique of Law and Economics 19 (Villanova University School of Law, Public
Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2005-6, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=700684.
244
See supra text accompanying notes 162-164. Or, as some have suggested,
law and economics generally views wealth (or utility) maximization as the end to which
all human undertakings are (or should be understood to be) directed. E.g., Herbert
Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 825-30 (1990).
245
See MacIntyre, supra note 3, at 140-41 (“An Aristotelian theory of the
virtues does therefore presuppose a crucial distinction between what any particular
individual at any particular time takes to be good for him and what is really good for
him as a man.” Professor Joseph Burke suggests that in economic parlance the natural
law approach essentially separates an individual’s preferences from that individual’s
welfare.
246
See supra note 223.
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furtherance of objective happiness (eudaimonia).247 Similarly,
under natural law thinking, happiness and true human
flourishing “does not consist in amusement” (or material
goods),248 but rather in living a life in accord with virtue.249
To better understand why a virtuous life leads to true
human flourishing (versus the satisfaction of subjective
preferences or the maximization of wealth or utility), it helps if
one is aware of the definition of virtue in the natural law
tradition: the habit of doing “good.”250 “Good,” in turn, refers to
that which is “to be done and aspired after” because of its
consistency with human nature (and, consequently, its
tendency to further humans toward their natural ends):251
[G]ood is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the
practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts
for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle
in the practical reason is one founded on the notions of good, viz.,
that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first
precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so
that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s
good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something
to be done or avoided.252

As alluded to previously, the ends of human existence
under natural law thinking (and unlike law and economics)
“are not arbitrary but rather determined by the dispositional

247
See Sargent, supra note 243, at 19; see also Luigino Bruni, The “Technology
of Happiness” and the Tradition of Economic Science, 26 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 19,
27 n.13 (2004).
248
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 194 (Roger Crisp trans. & ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) [hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS].
249
See id.; see also Bruni, supra note 247, at 26-29, 40; Sargent, supra note
243, at 19. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing necessarily inconsistent
between the goal of natural law (eudaimonia) and the goals of wealth creation (or,
moreover, the economic goals of securities regulation); a society in which investors are
protected, confidence in the markets is maintained, and national savings, capital
formation, and investment grow, is arguably establishing, at a minimum, the
preconditions of true human flourishing. See John E. Coons & Patrick E. Brennan,
Nature and Human Equality, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 287, 304 (1995) (noting the role of
material goods in the achievement of human happiness); ALEJANDRO A. CHAFUEN,
FAITH AND LIBERTY 7 (2003) (“One of the commonplaces in Aristotle is that most men
need a certain amount of material goods in order to practice virtue.”); ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS [1253b] 31 (reprint of 1905 Benjamin Jowett tr., Dover 2000) (“for no man can
live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries”).
250
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, Q. 55, Art. 1.
251
Id. Q. 94, Art. 2.
252
Id.
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properties which make up a human nature.”253 Via the
application of “right reason,” individuals can distinguish
between those acts that are good (i.e., in conformity with
human nature and therefore lead toward true happiness)
versus those acts that are evil (i.e., not in conformity with
human nature and therefore lead away from true happiness).254
In sum, therefore, natural law reasoning posits that:
(1) human beings
(eudaimonia),

are

naturally

oriented

toward

an

end

(2) action taken in furtherance of this end is objectively good (and
action taken in contradiction to this end is objectively evil);
(3) via the use of reason, individuals can come to recognize that
which is good from that which is evil;
(4) the habit of choosing good (and avoiding evil) is called virtue (and
its opposite called vice); and
(5) living a virtuous life is living a life in accord with human nature;
thus, the more virtuous an individual is, the more fully human that
individual is, and the more he or she maximizes his or her human
potential (and, consequently, his or her true happiness).255

c. Social Virtues and Truth
Particularly relevant to this Article is the natural law
observation that “man by his nature is a social animal.”256 From
this flows the understanding that many virtues are “social
virtues” (since “it is by reason of them that man behaves
himself well in human affairs”).257 As such, it is virtuous for
human beings to act “in the service of the common weal,” and
“to do well not only towards the community, but also towards
the parts of the community, viz., towards the household, or
even towards one individual.”258 It is not surprising, therefore,
253
ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS’S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 108 (Clarendon
Press 1996).
254
Id. at 108-09. Although the application of right reason to particular
situations is not always readily apparent, natural law theorists posit that certain broad
generalizations can nevertheless be made. See D.Q. MCINERNY, A COURSE IN
THOMISTIC ETHICS 242, 256 (1997). Thus, at a very high level, Aquinas identifies
eternal happiness, self-preservation, procreation, community, and education as human
“goods,” the pursuit of which “man has a natural inclination” and are “naturally
apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit.”
AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 94, Art. 2; see also RICE, supra note 139, at 52.
255
See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 248, at 16.
256
AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 61, Art. 5.
257
Id.
258
Id.
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to count among the virtues articulated within the natural law
tradition exactly those same features that Congress
highlighted as essential to properly ordered securities markets:
moderation, honesty, trustworthiness, and/or fairness.259
Additionally, the sina qua non of a securities market that is
characterized by moderation, honesty, trustworthiness, and/or
fairness is truth. With regard to truth, the Aristotelian natural
law tradition condemns, as a perversion of communication that
undermines the fabric of society, all forms of prevarication.260
This condemnation results from a consideration of the purpose
of communication and its role in society, along with an
estimation of the consequences to a society that suffers from a
lack of truthfulness.261 Thus, it can safely be concluded that
259
See C.S. LEWIS, ABOLITION OF MAN 51-61 (MacMillan 1947) (setting forth
“illustrations of the Natural Law” that include admonitions concerning general
beneficence, honesty, good faith and veracity, and justice). Because, as explained, right
reason enables human beings to comprehend conduct proper to their end, it comes not
as a surprise to the natural law theorist that so many peoples, across continents and
centuries, have come to recognize these (and other) virtues as such. See id; Linda M.
Sama & Victoria Shoaf, Reconciling Rules and Principles: An Ethics-Based Approach to
Corporate Governance, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 177, 183 (2005) (identifying truth, honesty,
and fairness as “global hypernorms”); George Bragues, The Ancients Against the
Moderns: Focusing on the Character of Corporate Leaders 27 tbl.1 (2006) (Paper
Presented at the IESE Bus. School, Univ. of Navarra, 14th Int’l Symposium on Ethics,
Business and Society, May 18-19, 2006) (setting forth Benjamin Franklin’s recognition
of moderation, sincerity, resolution, and justice, among others, as virtues).
260
See Lying, in IX THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 469-70 (1910), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm (“Aristotle, in his Ethics, seems to hold
that it is never allowable to tell a lie, while Plato, in his Republic, is more
accommodating; he allows doctors and statesmen to lie occasionally for the good of
their patients and for the common weal. Modern philosophers are divided in the same
way. Kant allowed a lie under no circumstance.”).
261
Natural law theory is not alone in condemning deceit, which can also be
condemned from perspectives of consequentialist and Kantian moral reasoning as well:

Truth consists in a correspondence between the thing signified and the
signification of it. Man has the power as a reasonable and social being of
manifesting his thoughts to his fellow-men. Right order demands that in
doing this he should be truthful. If the external manifestation is at variance
with the inward thought, the result is a want of right order, a monstrosity in
nature, a machine which is out of gear, whose parts do not work together
harmoniously.
....
The absolute malice of lying is also shown from the evil consequences which
it has for society. These are evident enough in lies which injuriously affect
the rights and reputations of others. But mutual confidence, intercourse, and
friendship, which are of such great importance for society, suffer much even
from officious and jocose lying. In this, as in other moral questions, in order
to see clearly the moral quality of an action we must consider what the effect
would be if the action in question were regarded as perfectly right and were
commonly practiced. Applying this test, we can see what mistrust, suspicion,
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natural law theorists would find research analysts who
prevaricate or otherwise mislead the investing public in breach
of the natural law.
d. Positive Law and the Common Good
It should not be concluded that the natural law’s
imprecation of deceit demands an absolute prohibition on all
false statements or opinions contained in research reports,
regardless of the quantity and quality of accompanying
disclosures. This leap—from natural law’s condemnation of
prevarication to legal prohibition of prevarication—fails to
recognize the important distinction between the natural law
per se and positive (human) law within natural law theory.262
Indeed, the proper role and scope of positive law under natural
law theory is limited.263
As expounded by Aquinas, human law exists not to
prohibit every vice or wrongful act, but rather for the more
modest purpose of promoting the “common good.”264 As with an
individual, the “common good” does not consist merely of
wealth or utility maximization, but rather, as Antonio
Genovesi put it, a society that exhibits “pubblica felicita”
(genuine public happiness).265 Given the interplay between
virtue and happiness, the common good could also be thought
of as “the creation of an economy and society that is more
virtuous rather than less.”266 Again, the critical role that virtue
plays here stems from the communitarian understanding of the
individual in the natural law tradition: “No [person] is an
island, sufficient unto himself . . . . All of the key social units

and utter want of confidence in others would be the result of promiscuous
lying, even in those cases where positive injury is not inflicted.
Id.
262

See Barnett, supra note 222, at 667 (“While a natural-law analysis could be
applied to a variety of questions, including the question of how human beings ought to
act (for example, vice and virtue), the question of how society ought to be structured is a
separate and quite distinct inquiry.” (emphasis in original)).
263
See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 96, Art. 1-2.
264
See id. Q. 96, Art. 1; see also D’ENTRÈVES, supra note 229, at 84 (“[H]uman
laws cover only those aspects of human behavior which imply a co-ordination with
other men.”).
265
Bruni, supra note 247, at 26.
266
Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic
Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 55 (2005).

2007]

A NATURAL LAW ANALYSIS OF ANALYST FRAUD

145

are very closely interrelated, and the moral health of any one of
them depends upon the moral health of the others.” 267
Since it is the common good that is the proper focus of
the positive law, and since not every vice or wrongful act
disturbs the common good to the same degree,268 enacted law
ought to focus on forbidding only the “more grievous” vices,
only those wrongful acts that threaten the common good.269 As
Aquinas explained:
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the
majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do
not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the
more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to
abstain, and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the
prohibition of which human society could not be maintained; thus
human law prohibits murder, theft and the like.270

With regard to the inculcation and development of
virtues, here too the role of positive law from a natural law
perspective is limited. For it is understood that “[l]aws cannot
make men moral.”271 However, as discussed, it is also
understood that individual virtue furthers the common good,
and thus “the laws have a legitimate subsidiary role to play in
helping people to make themselves moral.”272 To this end,
proponents of natural law have argued that
laws forbidding certain powerfully seductive and corrupting vices . . .
can help people to establish and preserve a virtuous character by (1)
preventing the (further) self-corruption which follows from acting out
a choice to indulge in immoral conduct; (2) preventing the bad
example by which others are induced to emulate such behavior; (3)
helping to preserve the moral ecology in which people make their
morally self-constituting choices; and (4) educating people about
moral right and wrong.273

It is also worth mentioning at this point the comments
of the SEC’s first Chairman, Joseph P. Kennedy, whose
267

See MCINERNY, supra note 254, at 241; see also FINNIS, supra note 221, at
165 (“Few will flourish, and no one will flourish securely, unless there is an effective
collaboration of persons, and co-ordination of resources and of enterprises . . . . Such an
ensemble of conditions of collaboration which enhance the well-being (or at least the
opportunity of flourishing) of all members of a community is, indeed, often called the
common good.”).
268
See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 47 (1993).
269
See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 96, Art. 2.
270
Id.
271
GEORGE, supra note 268, at 1.
272
Id.
273
Id.
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assessment probably still holds true today: “character exists
strongly in the financial world,” and that the SEC need not
“compel virtue,” but rather must “prevent vice.”274 The point
being, the raw material of virtue is already present in the
security industry’s participants; law is needed primarily to
protect, preserve, and foster this virtue, largely by preventing
its corruption—and not to create it out of whole cloth.
Such efforts to use the law to help “people to make
themselves moral” would appear particularly justified within
the context of the social virtues. As touched upon previously,
“[m]an is by nature a social animal, and this fact has
immediate implications for the moral life”: 275
Every man is a member of a community, and he is perfected in and
through that community. And it is just here where the influence of
law comes in. . . . Any community is a good community by reason of
the fact that it has good laws. And a good community, St. Thomas
argues, plays a vital role, especially through the medium of laws, in
fostering, supporting, and sustaining the moral goodness of its
individual members.276

A final relevant implication flowing from an
acknowledgment of the force of virtue is an appreciation of the
fact that economic self-interest is not the only influence upon
human activity.277 That is, a natural law theorist views virtue,
and the tendency toward the good (including a tendency toward
the common good), as fundamentally innate and therefore
capable of motivating human conduct.278 Thus, in seeking
solutions to problems, a natural law perspective would go
beyond the paradigm of motivations based solely upon selfinterest and cost-benefit analysis—beyond “the economist’s
standard reliance on a variety of taxes, subsidies, regulatory,
and other pecuniarily oriented measures.”279 The natural law
theorist would explore, for example, “[t]he government’s role in
moral suasion, and [seek its] influence [to] mold the ethical
274

See Walsh, supra note 140, at 1058.
MCINERNY, supra note 254, at 246 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 250,
Q. 92, Art. 1).
276
Id. at 246 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 92, Art. 1).
277
See Kapur, supra note 220, at 9 (“[T]here is a strong normative
prescription of non-purely self-interest behavior in the great religious and cultural
heritage of the world.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and
the Corporation 5, UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 03-20, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=461100.
278
See AQUINAS, supra note 250, Q. 63, Art. 1.
279
See Kapur, supra note 220, at 37.
275
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climate of the society generally.”280 He or she would consider
the capabilities of business leaders to set “the moral tone” of
their respective industries.281 In short, a broader array of means
would be considered under a natural law approach, not merely
those means which appeal to an individual’s self-interest.
Thus, in scrutinizing the problem of analyst conflicts of
interest, a natural law approach will first consider whether the
problem requires legislative circumscription, and, if so,
whether the misconduct at issue would best be curbed by (1)
simple prohibitions, and/or (2) efforts to increase the virtues
and/or decrease the vices that are at the root of the misconduct.
3. Application of Natural Law
Not surprisingly, applying natural law principles to the
problem of analyst conflicts yields results different from the
application of law and economics. Whereas the economist views
the problem as fundamentally one of inefficiency and/or market
failure arising from competing interests, the natural law
theorist views the problem as fundamentally a moral one: that
of research analysts succumbing to temptations to prevaricate
for profit.282 (Note the confluence of this diagnosis with that of
the progenitors of the Securities Acts to the securities industry
problems of their day.283) The natural law theorist will suggest
solutions that protect the common good directly, by seeking to
prevent the harm threatened by analyst misconduct, and
indirectly, by seeking to inculcate or strengthen the virtues
necessary to prevent such misconduct from reoccurring.284
However, it should be noted at the outset that this
difference does not necessarily indicate a trade-off of “wealth”
in favor of “virtue,” for the economic benefits promised by a
successful natural law approach would be significant. A regime
280

Id. at 38.
Id. at 47; see also Bragues, supra note 259, at 8.
282
Cf. Michael Prowse, Why Plastering over Capitalism’s Cracks Won’t Work,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 13, 2002, at 2 (“The root problem is a loss of belief in
objective ethical standards.”); William J. Bennett, Editorial, Capitalism and a Moral
Education, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2002, at C9 (identifying problems of corporate America
as stemming from a mentality of “putting profits ahead of principle”).
283
See supra Part III.A.
284
According to the former President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, corporate America’s problems and scandals stem primarily from a failure to
abide the fundamental commandment to “love thy neighbor.” William J. McDonough,
Remarks at the September 11 Commemorative Service at Trinity Church (Sept. 11,
2002), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2002/mcd020911.html.
281
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characterized by increased virtue would “conduce considerably
to the more efficient functioning of the economic system,
especially when informational asymmetries are pervasive, as
they invariably tend to be in modern, complex economies.”285
And, as referred to previously, President Roosevelt and
Congress, in addressing the economic crisis of the Great
Depression, explicitly identified moral rehabilitation of the
securities industry as a necessary prerequisite to the economic
restoration of the securities markets.286 Indeed, studies have
identified “the apparent decline in the ability to rely on the
honesty of other people (including employees) as a factor in
reduced U.S. productivity growth in the late 1970s.”287
Therefore, there are even purely economic reasons for
policymakers to seriously consider the insights of natural law.
The ultimate natural law solution to the problem of
research analyst conflicts of interest, therefore, even if merely
aspirational, would be a regime in which regulation were
unnecessary on account of the virtue of research analysts.
Research analysts would continue to do their best to please
their firm’s investment clients, but would resist the temptation
of issuing reports that contain feigned opinions and fraudulent
recommendations. But of course, if men were angels, we would
need neither law nor government.288 Virtue, therefore, becomes
a two-fold objective, pursued both because of its corrective
function within the context of securities law and as a
desideratum of natural law generally. Thus, a natural law
approach would seek means to inculcate such virtue. As virtue
is internal and choice-driven, it rarely (if ever) can be
developed through coercion, and so an array of incentives
conducive to its development would be preferable to injunctive
measures.289 To that end, broader means of encouragement and
exhortation, as discussed previously, would be mobilized.290 The
hope would be that, via a sustained and coordinated appeal to
the law already inscribed in the hearts of the market’s

285

See Kapur, supra note 220, at 45-46.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
287
See Kapur, supra note 220, at 36-37.
288
Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). But see ROBERT P. GEORGE,
IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 107 (1999) (“[L]aw would be necessary to coordinate the
behavior of members of the community for the sake of the common good even in a
society of angels.”).
289
See GERMAIN GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 58-59 (1997).
290
See text accompanying notes 277-281.
286
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participants,291 more punitive, coercive action to resolve the
problem of analyst misconduct would be unnecessary.
The failure of a system of such “virtue ethics,” based
upon the natural law, would cause society instead (as it has) to
resort to a system of ethics in which “the moral life . . . consists
mainly of complying with society’s mandated code of
conduct.”292 This is the legislative equivalent of stationing a
police officer on every corner—a situation that is impracticable
logistically, burdensome in cost, and awkward to free
societies.293 Moreover, such rule-based ethical regimes have
increasingly exhibited shortcomings, calling into question their
efficacy to regulate conduct.294 Nevertheless, it has long been
recognized that, as Professor Koniak has explained, “[n]orms
maintained by private means (morality, ethics, religious
principles) do not exist in a vacuum. They coexist, affect, and
are affected by the norms of law.”295 The solution to societal
problems, therefore, lies in fashioning the optimal mix of
incentives and disincentives, coercive and non-coercive, in
pursuit of the ends sought.296
In the absence of an effective voluntary ethics regime, or
some other non-coercive solution to the problem of analyst
conflicts, the next question becomes whether the false
portrayal of a researcher’s opinions is a wrongdoing of such
magnitude that it justifies the imposition of legal
intervention—including all the costs associated with such an
291

See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
See Bainbridge, supra note 277, at 5. For an explanation of the distinction
between a rules-based versus a principles-based system of ethics (which this statement
implicates), see Sama & Shoaf, supra note 259, at 179-82.
293
Cf. HART, supra note 139, at 162 (“There is a limit to the amount of law
enforcement that any society can afford, even when moral wrong has been done.”);
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288-330 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Knopf 1993) (1835) (addressing “[p]rinciple causes which tend to maintain the
democratic republic in the United States”).
294
See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 212-14 (2003). See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443 (2006) (addressing the repercussions of neglecting the role of
morality in antitrust enforcement).
295
Koniak, supra note 294, at 225.
296
An example of creative, non-coercive means that could be employed to
assuage the problem of analyst conflicts is provided by the aforementioned Global
Settlement, which directed a portion of settlement proceeds to the funding of investor
education and independent research. See supra text accompanying note 34. A better
educated investing public, coupled with the provision of more independent research,
could serve to temper bias in research reporting by reducing the effectiveness of
disingenuous opinions; by virtue of their increased understanding coupled with more
widely-available “second opinions” from independent research analysts, the public
would, arguably, be less susceptible to fraudulent opinions.
292
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imposition. Intentional deceit known to have such serious,
harmful consequences for as many victims as analyst fraud
ostensibly has had would, I suggest, readily cross the threshold
of grievousness to justify legal intervention under natural law
principles.297 And, assuming the failure of other means to curb
the problem, it would seem that legal intervention over the
issue would not only be justified, but essential.
The last issue to consider, therefore, is the nature of the
legal intervention most fitting to address the problem of
analyst conflicts under a natural law approach.
a. Laissez-Faire Approach
A laissez-faire approach, relying upon market forces to
check dishonesty, would not be favored because such an
approach contemplates (and permits) the persistence of a
certain amount of deception and dishonesty. The long-term
impact of such a regime on society cannot be expected to be
good, for it (1) acknowledges a role for dishonesty in the
professional work of an entire class of individuals (research
analysts) and (2) broadcasts the message that dishonesty is an
expected part of certain commercial activity.
b. Mandatory Disclosure
It is unlikely that a natural law theorist would be
comfortable with a rule protecting analysts from liability for
dishonest opinions so long as full and accurate disclosure of
their conflicts and all the underlying factual data accompanies
such opinions. An argument justifying such a rule in terms
palatable to a natural law proponent would stress that in the
context of a full disclosure rule any harm to society resulting
from feigned analyst opinions and recommendations would be
minimal, and therefore not grievous enough to warrant
legislative intervention.298 But the justification behind this
approach focuses solely on the economic consequences of such
deception, without regard to the severity of the moral
implications to society. For the very fact of circumscribing the
limits of the deception arguably institutionalizes it, implying
297
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 277, at 4 (noting that “there is a limit at which
forbearance ceases to be a virtue” and at which point “the state properly steps in. The
prudential question is when forbearance becomes a vice.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
298
See supra Part III.C.2.d.
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state approval thereof if contained within the established
bounds. The coarsening effect of such a situation, both upon the
individuals concerned and on society at large, would appear to
warrant state intervention given the importance of
truthfulness to the proper functioning of society.299
Additionally, a disclosure-alone regime300 would also
conflict with natural law principles by placing the common
good (that is, the good of all investors and that of society as a
whole) second to the particular good (that is, the benefit of
those investors sophisticated enough to avail themselves of full
disclosure and avoid being deceived by dishonest analyst
opinions—even if these investors happen to be in the
majority).301 From a natural law perspective, a regime designed
merely to blunt the effects of deception (such as a disclosure
rule by itself) would be inferior to a regime that prohibited
deception per se.
c. Antifraud Rule
In light of the preceding, it unsurprisingly follows that
a natural law approach would favor an antifraud rule
applicable to analyst statements (including opinions and
recommendations) over a rule simply mandating the disclosure
of conflicts. And although this was not the conclusion reached
as optimal under the general law and economics approach set
forth previously (largely because of its costs, including the
perceived threat to the vitality of the research-analyst
industry),302 it should be noted that such an approach is
nevertheless a recommendation made by some who subscribe to
an economic approach to the law.303 For application of a strict
antifraud rule to analyst statements could reap the benefits of
a market-derived quantity of disclosure and provide a
299
See supra Part III.C.2.c. Admittedly, the argument in favor of state
intervention becomes much weaker if the purported economic harms to society of
analyst misconduct are significantly diminished.
300
Or, put differently, a regime in which analysts are shielded from liability
for their feigned opinions if their research reports also contained sufficient cautionary
disclosure as per the bespeaks caution doctrine and/or the PSLRA’s safe harbor rule.
301
Although it is laudable for an individual or group of individuals to
voluntarily make personal sacrifices for the common good, it is not laudable to wrong a
minority for the sake of the majority under natural law principles. Indeed, this would
seem to violate the natural law prohibition on using the ends intended to justify the
means employed. See McInerny, supra note 254, at 80.
302
See supra Part III.B.2.c.
303
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 166, at 1024.
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safeguard against disclosure that was fraudulent or otherwise
misleading.304
d. Structural Approach
Finally, a natural law theorist could be expected to
heartily endorse structural correctives to the problem of
analyst conflicts, such as those set forth by NASD’s Rule
2711,305 in addition to other market-influencing efforts, such as
the funding of investor education and independent research (as
per the Global Settlement306). As explained, a natural law
approach seeks to fashion an environment that encourages,
rather than undermines, virtue.307 Investor education, and the
increased availability of independent research, both serve to
reduce the effectiveness (and harm) of biased research
reporting and, consequently, should diminish the allure of
dishonest reporting.308 And absent a structural solution, the
analyst’s conflicted situation presents a constant and forceful
temptation to falsify his or her opinions and recommendations
in order to advance his or her own pecuniary self-interest.
Although the ability of the law to coerce virtue is questionable
to say the least,309 the law can certainly remove certain
impediments to the development of virtue. Freed from such
impediments, individuals are more likely to develop the habits
of virtue, or at the very least are less likely to succumb to the
temptations of vice.310 For this reason, a structural solution to
the problem of analyst conflicts would coincide nicely with the
ends of both the securities laws and natural law philosophy.

304

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 10, at 1086.
See supra Part II.B.2.d.
306
See supra text accompanying notes 34, 296.
307
See supra Part III.C.2.d; see also GEORGE, supra note 268, at 44-45;
cf. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudio Reis Socialis ¶ 36 (Dec. 30, 1987),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/
hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html (“ ‘Sin’ and ‘structures of sin’ are
categories which are seldom applied to the situation of the contemporary world.
However, one cannot easily gain a profound understanding of the reality that confronts
us unless we give a name to the root of the evils which afflict us.”).
308
See supra note 296.
309
See supra note 289 and accompanying text. The concept of “coerced” virtue
is arguably a contradiction in terms. Cf. Barnett, supra note 222, at 669 (“Although
principles of natural-law ethics can be used to guide one’s conduct, they should not be
enforced coercively by human law if doing so would violate the moral space or liberty
defined by natural rights.”).
310
See GEORGE, supra note 268, at 27, 44.
305
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4. Summary of the Natural Law Approach
Thus, from a natural law perspective, a laissez-faire
solution to the problem of analyst conflicts would be rejected,
and a rule merely requiring disclosure of such conflicts would
likewise be deemed insufficient. Instead, the natural law
theorist would endorse an antifraud rule barring the
misstatement of analyst opinions and, perhaps even more
enthusiastically, endorse a structural remedy that would
reduce, if not eliminate, the problematic conflicts of interest
themselves.
Lastly, one cannot ignore those who have questioned the
utility of natural law reasoning on the ground that it fails to
provide a certain, clear method of generating solutions to realworld problems.311 It is admittedly the case that “the natural
law does not determine once and for all the perfect scheme
of . . . regulation. A number of different schemes . . . are
consistent with the natural law.”312 However, natural law
philosophy does provide the policy maker with principles that
guide his or her decision-making, and application of these
guiding principles can lead a policy maker to favor one
potential remedy to a problem over another. In light of this, the
flexibility left open to the policy maker by natural law
reasoning is an advantage rather than a disadvantage to its
use. Finally, it should be noted that, at least based upon an
examination of the research analyst conflicts of interest
problem, the mainstream law and economics approach does not
appear any more determinate than the natural law approach.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. securities laws were predicated upon an
appreciation of virtue and vice. Their interrelated objectives
and concerns included (1) the promotion of a fairer, more
virtuous securities industry, (2) the protection of the individual
investor, and (3) the good health of capital markets. Over time,
in no small part due to the advance of law and economics
thinking, the first of these objectives has been all but forgotten,
and some scholars today even question the second. What is
needed in order to recover respect for the entirety of concerns
311
See, e.g., Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious
Freedom, and Racial Equality, 40 HOW. L.J. 513, 548 (1997).
312
GEORGE, supra note 288, at 108 (using “traffic regulation” as an example).
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that spawned the U.S. securities regulatory regime is an
approach to securities regulation that shares these concerns. In
natural law philosophy we have such an approach.
Via the examination of a particular securities law
problem—that of research analyst conflicts of interest—this
Article has attempted to demonstrate the benefits of a natural
law approach to securities regulation. Unlike the economic
approach, which favored solutions not entirely consonant with
the values or full range of objectives of U.S. securities law, the
natural law approach favored solutions consistent with all
these values and objectives. The high value placed on veracity
within the natural law tradition, in addition to the tradition’s
recognition that efforts should be undertaken to remove or
reduce those root influences that tempt wrongdoing, coincide
well with U.S. securities regulation in both theory and practice.
Also coinciding is the perceived importance of moral character
and virtue.
But the differences between a natural law approach and
a law and economics approach should not be unduly inflated.
As each approach is grounded in an understanding of human
nature and behavior (albeit, an understanding that at times
diverges), there is room for significant agreement between
them. Additionally, the analytical power of the law and
economics approach cannot be gainsaid. Perhaps the optimal,
eventual result of this inquiry would be the proper integration
of the economic approach to law within the broader framework
of natural law thinking.

